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Security Council

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Identical letters dated 8 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 6 October 2001 from Mr. Naji Sabri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq. The Minister calls attention to the ongoing wanton aggression against Iraq by United States and British aircraft in the unlawful no-flight zones and to the fact that in the period from 19 to 30 September 2001 they carried out 216 hostile sorties, 93 of them from Saudi Arabia, 37 from Kuwait and 86 from Turkey, as shown in the statement enclosed with the letter. On 20 September such aircraft fired missiles at an Iraqi site in the Basrah area; on 21 September they bombed two sites in Maysan and Dhi Qar governorates; and on 27 September they fired missiles at two Iraqi sites in Basrah governorate. One Iraqi was wounded in these attacks and many installations were destroyed.

The Minister reaffirms the Government of Iraq's condemnation of these acts of aggression against Iraqi territory, and he states that international responsibility for them must be borne by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the countries that provide the logistic support for this aggression, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey. He urges you to perform the duties assigned to you under the Charter by halting this unwarranted aggression and ensuring that it does not recur.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 8 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I should like to inform you that United States and British warplanes based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey have continued to violate the airspace of the Republic of Iraq. They flew 216 armed sorties in the period from 19 to 30 September 2001, 93 of them from Saudi Arabia, 37 from Kuwait and 86 from Turkey, as shown in the statement enclosed herewith. On 20 September such aircraft fired missiles at an Iraqi site in the Basrah area; on 21 September they bombed two Iraqi sites in Maysan and Dhi Qar governorates; and on 27 September they fired missiles at two Iraqi sites in Basrah governorate. One Iraqi was wounded in these attacks and many installations were destroyed.

The hostile terrorist action in which the United States of America and the United Kingdom have been engaged against Iraq since 1991 seeks to undermine the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, to inflict systematic and concerted destruction on Iraq and on its infrastructure and vital amenities and to kill its people. It is a policy that is being affirmed in successive statements made by United States and British officials.

Most of the world's countries, including the Arab countries, have condemned the maintenance of the no-flight zones as representing an illegitimate use of force against an independent State. Three countries that are permanent members of the Security Council, namely the Russian Federation, China and France, have stressed the fact that the enforcement of the no-flight zones in northern and southern Iraq has no basis in any principle of international law. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary-General, has stated that the claim made by the United States that Security Council resolution 688 (1991) authorizes the imposition of the no-flight zones is groundless. At his press conference of 27 June 2001, Mr. Kofi A. Annan also said that there was no basis in the resolutions of the Security Council for the imposition of the no-flight zones in northern and southern Iraq. His actual words were (SG/SM/7865):

> "You know my position on this, and I have indicated that when you analyse and read the Security Council resolutions I do not see the Security Council resolutions as a basis for that."

The Government of Iraq categorically rejects the two so-called no-flight zones, which were imposed by unilateral decision of the United States and the United Kingdom and lack any legal basis. Iraq rejects all the flimsy excuses and pretexts stemming from this illegal decision that are used by these States in engaging in this hostile terrorist action in an attempt on their part to justify their military aggression against our country.

The logistic support made available by the governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey to the United States and the United Kingdom, which includes the provision of air bases, has made them key partners in the terrorist aggression against Iraq, so that they bear international responsibility under international law. This includes liability for full compensation for the loss and damage, in both human and material terms, that is caused by these illegal practices.

The Government of Iraq further renews its appeal to the countries participating in this terrorist aggression to desist forthwith from internationally prohibited terrorist acts that violate Iraq's sovereignty and place its security and integrity in grave danger and that pose a direct and serious threat to international peace and security.

As it condemns these hostile terrorist acts against Iraqi residential areas and civilian and military installations, the Government of Iraq urges you, given that you have stated that there is no basis in the resolutions of the Security Council for the imposition of the no-flight zones, to perform the duties assigned to you as they relate to the maintenance of international peace and security, to call upon the governments of the countries in question to halt, end and desist from any resumption of this terrorist aggression against Iraq — an independent, sovereign State and a founding Member of the United Nations — and to charge those committing the aggression and the regional parties that have associated themselves with it, namely Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, with full legal responsibility for their persistence in this crime.

(*Signed*) Naji **Sabri**
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Enclosure

Violations of the airspace of the Republic of Iraq by United States and British warplanes, 19-30 September 2001

1. In the northern region 86 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 12,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1315 hours on 19 September 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from a base in Turkey and from Turkish airspace penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 14 armed sorties, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Amadiyah, Baibo, Aqrah, Dohuk, Irbil and Rawanduz areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1545 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1230 hours on 20 September 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Turkey and from Turkish airspace penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 16 armed sorties, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Dohuk, Irbil, Mosul, Aqrah, Rawanduz and Amadiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1510 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1400 hours on 21 September 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Turkey and from Turkish airspace penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 10 armed sorties, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Amadiyah, Zakho, Baibo, Aqrah, Dohuk, Irbil and Ayn Zalah areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1635 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1400 hours on 24 September 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft coming from bases in Turkey and from Turkish airspace penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 14 armed sorties, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Amadiyah, Dohuk, Aqrah, Ayn Zalah, Baibo and Irbil areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1620 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 1258 hours on 25 September 2001, United States and British F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Turkey and from Turkish airspace penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 14 armed sorties, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Aqrah, Irbil, Ayn Zalah and Dokan areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1530 hours, drove them off.

(f) At 1530 hours on 26 September 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Turkey and from Turkish airspace penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 18 armed sorties, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Amadiyah, Aqrah, Dohuk and Irbil areas.

Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1730 hours, drove them off.

2. In the southern region 130 armed sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 9,000 to 13,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1555 hours on 19 September 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 19 armed sorties, 16 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and three from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Nasiriyah, Samawah, Shatrah, Rifa'i, Basrah, Salman, Ashbajah and Lasaf areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1735 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1435 hours on 20 September 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Saudi and Kuwaiti airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 17 armed sorties, 10 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and seven from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Busayyah, Lasaf, Salman and Rifa'i areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1650 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1245 hours on 21 September 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Saudi and Kuwaiti airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 20 armed sorties, 11 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and nine from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Amghar, Lasaf, Salman, Jalibah, Busayyah, Nasiriyah, Amarah and Qal'at Sukkar areas. The United States and British aircraft fired missiles at military units in Maysan and Dhi Qar governorates. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1445 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1125 hours on 22 September 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 10 armed sorties from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and overflew the Salman, Busayyah and Ashbajah areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1230 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 1110 hours on 25 September 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 18 armed sorties, 16 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and two from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Artawi, Ashbajah, Jalibah and Lasaf areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1330 hours, drove them off.

(f) At 1305 hours on 27 September 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 25 armed sorties, 16 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and nine from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Nukhayb, Busayyah, Nasiriyah, Ma`aniyah, Jalibah, Salman, Shatrah, Artawi, Basrah, Qurnah, Ashbajah, Shinafiyah and Amghar areas. The United States and British aircraft fired missiles at military units in Basrah governorate, wounding one Iraqi and destroying many civilian installations. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1530 hours, drove them off.

(g) At 1435 hours on 30 September 2001, United States and British F-14 and F-15 aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 21 armed sorties, 14 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and seven from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Lasaf, Ma`aniyah, Ashbajah, Busayyah, Salman, Basrah, Jalibah and Nasiriyah areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1610 hours, drove them off.

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Letter dated 8 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 4 October 2001 from Mr. Naji Sabri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. Appended to the Minister's letter is a table showing violations of Iraq's international boundaries committed by United States and British warplanes flying across the demilitarized zone monitored by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in the period from 15 to 28 September 2001.

The Minister urges you to instruct UNIKOM to perform its duties in full, to report these violations to the Security Council through you immediately they occur and to specify the number and nationality of the warplanes that violate the demilitarized zone, given that such violations constitute wanton aggression against Iraq and against its people, its sovereignty and its territory, as well as against United Nations peacekeeping operations. He further asks you to alert the Security Council to its responsibility to halt this aggression and ensure that the aggressors are held accountable for it under international law.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 8 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to our letter dated 19 September 2001 (S/2001/898, annex), I should like to inform you that United States and British warplanes committed 52 violations of Iraq's international boundaries from bases in Kuwait, from Kuwait's airspace and territorial waters and by way of the demilitarized zone monitored by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in the period from 15 to 28 September 2001. As shown in the table appended to this letter, the relevant Iraqi agencies have determined that the violations committed were as follows:

1. Armed aerial activity by the United States and the United Kingdom, violating our international boundaries from United States and British bases in Kuwait, from Kuwait's airspace and territorial waters and by way of the demilitarized zone, comprised 52 armed sorties in the following governorates: Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Basrah, Maysan and Qadisiyah.

2. Our technical systems identified the aircraft violating Iraq's airspace on a daily basis as American F-14s, F-15s and F-18s and British Tornadoes.

3. An AWACS aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace provided support to all of the United States and British aircraft that carried out armed and hostile sorties, violating Iraq's airspace by way of the demilitarized zone.

4. Between 15 and 28 September 2001, a total of 14 remotely piloted aircraft violated Iraq's airspace from United States and British bases in Kuwait, from Kuwait's airspace and territorial waters and by way of the demilitarized zone.

All of the violations in question were committed by way of the demilitarized zone in which UNIKOM is stationed. One of UNIKOM's primary responsibilities is to monitor such hostile military operations and to report them and endeavour to halt them immediately.

The fair-minded nations of the world, including the Arab countries, have condemned the maintenance of the no-flight zones as representing a terrorist act and an illegitimate use of force against an independent, sovereign State. Three countries that are permanent members of the Security Council, namely the Russian Federation, China and France, have stressed the fact that the enforcement of the no-flight zones in northern and southern Iraq has no basis in any principle of international law. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, your predecessor as Secretary-General, has stated that the claim made by the United States that Security Council resolution 688 (1991) authorizes the imposition of the no-flight zones is groundless. At your press conference of 27 June 2001, you said that there was no basis in the resolutions of the Security Council for the imposition of the no-flight zones in northern and southern Iraq. Your actual words were (SG/SM/7865):

> "You know my position on this, and I have indicated that when you analyse and read the Security Council resolutions I do not see the Security Council resolutions as a basis for that."

The violations being committed by the United States and the United Kingdom involving 10 to 20 military aircraft on a daily basis are tantamount to an undeclared

war. It is imperative that the United Nations should take the measures that are required in their regard under the Charter so that the aggression may be halted and those who have committed the violations may be held fully responsible for them under international law and liable for payment of compensation to Iraq.

The statements of UNIKOM to the effect that it is unable to monitor or identify these aircraft are untenable in the light of the scientific and technological capabilities that are available or that UNIKOM is in a position to acquire and utilize in order to fulfil the requirements of its mandate and establish the identity and country of the warplanes that are violating Iraq's sovereign airspace, so that the necessary measures can then be taken by the Security Council to halt these violations and acts of aggression.

I accordingly urge you once more to instruct UNIKOM to perform its duties in full, to report these violations to the Security Council through you immediately they occur and to specify the number and nationality of the warplanes that violate the demilitarized zone and commit aggression against Iraq, given that they constitute wanton aggression against Iraq and against its people, its sovereignty and its territory, as well as against United Nations peacekeeping operations. I also ask you to alert the Security Council to its responsibility to halt this aggression and ensure that the aggressors, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, are held accountable for it under international law.

(*Signed*) Naji **Sabri**
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Enclosure

Hostile aerial activity violating Iraq's international boundaries from Kuwait and by way of the demilitarized zone, 15-28 September 2001

No.	*Date*	*From*	*Time*	*Type*	*Armed sorties*	*Altitude (metres)*	*Speed (km/h)*	*Areas overflown*
1	15-21 September	Kuwait	0920-1955	F-14, F-15, F-18 drone	37 (including 7 drones)	8,000-11,000	180-780	Basrah, Qurnah, Jalibah, Amarah, Busayyah, Nasiriyah, Artawi, Rifa'i, Qal'at Salih
2	22-28 September	Kuwait	0820-2000	F-15, drone	15 (including 7 drones)	8,000-10,000	180-780	Samawah, Nasiriyah, Basrah, Amarah, Umm Qasr, Safwan, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Jalibah

Total sorties: 52

Note: The total number of armed aerial violations committed from Kuwaiti territory in the period from 17 December 1998 to 28 September 2001 was 10,465.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1294 (2000) of 13 April 2000, in which the Council requested me to submit to it periodic reports on developments in Angola, including recommendations about additional measures the Council might consider to promote the peace process in the country. The present report provides an update of the situation since my report of 11 April 2001 (S/2001/351).

II. Political developments

2. Deep animosity and distrust, fuelled by hate propaganda, have persisted between the Government and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) led by Mr. Jonas Savimbi. Despite the increasing pressure from the civil society for a political settlement of the conflict, fighting has continued unabated with dire humanitarian consequences.

3. The guerrilla activities of UNITA have spread to several parts of the country, particularly in recent months. On 4 May 2001, UNITA forces attacked the locality of Caxito in Bengo province (60 kilometres north-east of Luanda), killing approximately 150 persons and wounding several others, as well as kidnapping 60 children from a school run by a non-governmental organization, who were later released on 25 May. In addition to several other incidents of ambushes and attacks, UNITA claimed responsibility for shooting at a World Food Programme (WFP) plane near Kuito, Bié province, in June, and the attack on a passenger train in Kwanza Norte province in August 2001, the latter incident having led to the death of over 250 persons with many more injured. The Secretary-General condemned the deliberate attack on the train and underlined the urgent need for a political settlement of the conflict (SG/SM/7916). In both the plane and train attacks, UNITA alleged that government forces and war materiel were being transported, charges vigorously denied by the Government. It also used the two incidents to indicate that the movement was ready to reciprocate any gesture or initiative from the Government towards a ceasefire, and to reiterate its willingness to dialogue.

4. Following the Caxito attack, the Inter-Denominational Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA) issued a press release on 29 May appealing for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. It also reiterated the validity of the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex) as the basis for any future discussions, and reminded the parties of the need for all sensitive issues to be brought to the negotiating table.

5. In a speech in Luanda during the opening of an international conference on 2 May, President José Eduardo dos Santos, among other things, explained that his Government had opted for a military solution to the Angolan conflict as a matter of legitimate self-defence. The President also seized the occasion to reiterate the four-point peace proposal of the Government, referred to in my last report (S/2001/351, para. 6). He then asked Mr. Savimbi to indicate when he intended to end the war and how to conclude the Lusaka Protocol. On 28 August, President dos Santos once again invited Mr. Savimbi to declare a ceasefire, lay down his weapons and join the democratic process.

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6. On 13 May, Mr. Savimbi addressed a letter to the church requesting it to continue its search for peace and national reconciliation in Angola. He stated that UNITA was prepared for an all-inclusive national debate on how to end the war. A month later, in an interview given to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Mr. Savimbi pointed out that his movement could neither declare a unilateral ceasefire nor disarm because there were no verification mechanisms in place. The leadership of UNITA also issued a document entitled "Proposals for the solution of the Angolan conflict" in which it, inter alia, proposed the establishment of a transitional government, and the creation of a High Council of Peace composed of the historic leaders of the ruling Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA), UNITA, Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and other political as well as civil society leaders. The document also called for the mutual acceptance of guilt, revocation of all laws against UNITA and the lifting of sanctions by the Security Council. In September, the Secretary for External Relations of UNITA also addressed a letter to the Secretary-General in which it reiterated UNITA's interpretation of the Lusaka Protocol.

7. In its response to the different initiatives proposed by UNITA, the Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé (CEAST) reiterated its appeal for a bilateral, simultaneous and urgent ceasefire. It also transmitted to Mr. Savimbi a letter signed by the Bishops of Southern Africa in which they made proposals on how to resolve the Angolan conflict, including a bilateral and simultaneous ceasefire and amnesty. In early September, the Vice-President of UNITA, General António Sebastião Dembo, replied positively to the proposals put forward by CEAST and COIEPA. A peace network was also formed in early September comprising several prominent church and civil society dignitaries.

8. Some members of MPLA have rejected the church proposals, arguing that they represented an attempt to put the Government and UNITA on an equal footing. However, UNITA issued a press release acknowledging receipt of the correspondence from the church and promising to take concrete steps to respond to the appeal of the Bishops for peace. For its part, on 27 April, the Angolan National Assembly decided to create a 24-member ad hoc Commission for Peace and National Reconciliation. It also approved proposals for the establishment of mechanisms that would facilitate contacts with the warring parties and other relevant actors. The Commission, which is chaired by a member of the ruling party, was given six months to submit its report.

9. In August, UNITA released a document entitled "Proposals for the solution of the Angolan conflict" in which it proposed, inter alia, the establishment of a transitional government and the creation of a high council of peace composed of the leaders of the two parties, as well as other prominent political and civil society dignitaries. As the Lusaka Protocol remains the basis of the peace process, it is unlikely that the UNITA proposal will be considered a viable option.

10. The timing of the next general elections continued to generate controversy. In early August, the Council of the Republic met under the chairmanship of President dos Santos and decided to maintain the original schedule of the second half of 2002 for the elections. However, most opposition parties have argued that the prevailing political and military situation was not conducive to such an exercise. Meanwhile, on 23 August, in a speech to the Central Committee of the ruling MPLA, President dos Santos announced his intention not to stand as a candidate in the next general elections. The President also indicated that before the elections were to take place, there was a need to revise the electoral law, adopt a new constitution, carry out a population census, resettle most of the displaced population, and have security guarantees to enable the free circulation of people.

11. The Government of Côte d'Ivoire has continued to make efforts to improve its relations with Angola. In May 2001, President Laurent Gbagbo made an official visit to Angola during which he addressed a special session of the National Assembly. In his speech, President Gbagbo, among other things, promised to strictly respect the sanctions against UNITA by ensuring that it never again used the territory of Côte d'Ivoire as a base from which to destabilize the Government of Angola. He also pledged to withdraw before the end of June 2001 all Ivoirian passports issued to officials of UNITA.

12. Relations between Angola and Zambia have also continued to improve. During the past six months, there have been a number of mutual visits by the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers of both countries. In addition, on 26 June, President dos Santos

attended in Lusaka a tripartite meeting with his Namibian and Zambian counterparts devoted to security cooperation. In a speech at the mini-summit, President dos Santos expressed satisfaction with the situation along the Angolan-Zambian border and acknowledged the contributions of Namibia and Zambia towards peace in Angola. As a result of these improvements, the military of the two countries have agreed to begin joint patrols of their common borders.

13. The Security Council discussed the question of Angola on 20 September and issued a statement by the President of the Council (S/PRST/2001/24) in which it condemned in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks by UNITA forces on the civilian population. The statement also mentioned the Council's determination to keep sanctions against UNITA in place until it was convinced that the conditions in its relevant resolutions had been met. The Council considered the four-point agenda for peace proposed by the Government of Angola a useful indication of areas where an agreement or progress should be reached. It also encouraged the Government to promote the peace process and welcomed the initiatives by the Government, as well as by the Angolan people, including civil society and the churches.

14. On 21 September, I met with Mr. Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos "Nandó", Minister of the Interior, who noted that the relations between the Government and the United Nations had improved, and emphasized that the international community had a role to play, specifically in assisting the management of the Fund for Peace and National Reconciliation, and the pilot project for the resettlement of the population affected by the conflict, and in preparation towards the general elections. I reiterated my view that the conflict could not be solved by military means alone and that creative ways would have to be found to put an end to the war within the framework of the Lusaka Protocol.

15. During the period under review, members of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA established under Security Council resolution 1295 (2000) paid several visits to Angola. They held discussions with the Government and former military officials of UNITA as well as with representatives of the diplomatic community. The Mechanism is expected to submit a supplementary report to the Council in mid-October.

16. My Adviser for Special Assignments in Africa, Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari, visited Angola in early May 2001 to consult with the Government of that country and other relevant parties on how best the United Nations could help accelerate the peace process. During his stay, Mr. Gambari held consultations with several political and church leaders, as well as with some non-governmental organizations and members of the diplomatic community. He was received in audience by President dos Santos to whom he handed a message from me. In his reply on 15 May, the President acknowledged the positive impact of sanctions against UNITA and sought the assistance of the United Nations in the forthcoming electoral process, and a pilot project for the resettlement of the war-affected and demobilized combatants, as well as the Fund for Peace and National Reconciliation for which his Government has allocated US$ 20 million. Regarding the peace process, President dos Santos promised to inform me in due course of the outcome of the ongoing internal debate in the country on this crucial matter. Following the letter of the President and my reply dated 6 June, in which I promised the assistance of the Organization in the three areas, a United Nations-led multidisciplinary team was sent to Angola in late September to discuss the details of the request with the authorities. The mission has since returned to Headquarters and its recommendations will be carefully considered by the Secretariat for necessary follow-up action.

III. Human rights aspects

17. The human rights situation continued to be undermined by the ongoing conflict. Humanitarian principles were largely ignored, with civilians subjected to a wide range of human rights abuses. Ambushes on main roads and landmines endangered the lives of civilians and limited freedom of movement. There were also reports of lootings, rapes, kidnappings and the abduction of under-age children for use as porters. Recently, UNITA has begun to target civilians with greater intensity. The attack on a civilian train in Kwanza Norte province for which UNITA claimed responsibility is an indication of a serious deterioration in the human rights situation.

18. Through its partnerships with government authorities and civil society at the local and national levels, the human rights programme of the United

Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) is helping to establish sustainable mechanisms that enable Angolan citizens to know and exercise their rights while supporting those government institutions that are responsible for their protection. The programme is committed to increasing its activities in order to improve law enforcement and human rights protection. This has been a major challenge owing to the weakness of the national justice system, which is practically non-existent in the countryside, particularly in the areas severely affected by guerrilla warfare.

19. Recognizing the fragility of the institutions of the judicial system, the Government has requested that UNOA expand its human rights activities to the provinces with a view to ensuring the protection of its citizens who are subject to regular violations of their basic rights. In response, and in partnership with the Government and civil society, UNOA has carried out a large number of activities and projects, funded through voluntary contributions and aimed especially at developing and broadening access to justice. They include the support of a case-tracking system project in partnership with the Office of the Prosecutor General, the penitentiary and the National Departments of Criminal Investigation and Economic Police. This project seeks to increase the effectiveness of legal control over pre-trial detentions and imprisonment. The project is at this stage limited to Luanda with the exception of the Prosecutor General's Office case-tracking system which was extended to Huíla and Benguela provinces.

20. Another area of support was aimed at the Angolan Bar Association through the conducting of a study to evaluate the functioning of the justice system. The results, which were discussed in a panel composed of representatives of relevant government ministries and institutions, the National Assembly and civil society, showed a serious lack of qualified personnel and material resources. The lack of municipal courts and of legal assistance for Angolan citizens had been addressed to some extent in Luanda through UNOA's efforts with the Government and through various legal aid programmes such as that of the non-governmental lawyers in Mãos Livres and the Emergency Legal Aid project. Mãos Livres has already been extended to Benguela and Huíla; but the remaining 16 provinces urgently need attention at this stage. UNOA stands ready to support and strengthen these programmes, especially in the provinces that are in particular need of assistance.

21. UNOA also continues to support nationwide projects with the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), the Angolan National Police, the Prosecutor General's Office and the Ministry of Justice with a view to improving the capacity of these institutions in the protection of human rights. It has also been assisting the ninth commission of the National Assembly, which is mandated to mediate on violations of human rights perpetrated by State institutions and administration. The Commission lacks personnel and material resources to effectively deal with an average of 60 claims per day. The project aims at establishing a database in order to better compile and manage incoming petitions. As a natural progression of the programmes successfully conducted at the central level, UNOA will gradually expand its support activities to the provinces as conditions warrant.

22. The question of freedom of expression continues to be troubling despite the existence of some independent media in Luanda and Benguela. In the light of the importance of the next elections, it is imperative that awareness on freedom of expression be promoted not only in Luanda where court cases have been argued by lawyers from non-governmental organizations but especially in the provinces. UNOA maintained and developed its awareness activities in partnership with the Human Rights Department of the Ministry of Justice and Radio Ecclesia both in Luanda and in the provinces. Again, in conjunction with the National Radio Station, UNOA has broadcast 24 human rights plays in four national languages.

23. Given the urgent need to respond to the overall protection of internally displaced persons, the Human Rights Division of UNOA has developed a close collaboration with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and has increased its efforts to ensure full implementation of the United Nations protection strategy (April 2001), within the overall framework given by the Government's approval of the minimum standards for the resettlement of displaced populations. The Division has been requested to play a major role in defining a common set of objectives for capacity-building and community mobilization.

24. Three key areas have been identified for the future work of UNOA's human rights programme: access to justice, right of citizen participation and confidence-building. An effort will also be made to assume the full integration of the human rights activities within the overall mandate of UNOA, and to ensure close cooperation with United Nations agencies in Angola.

IV. Humanitarian situation

25. Despite tangible progress made during the past six months in stabilizing populations in accessible areas, the humanitarian situation remains serious, particularly in inaccessible regions, where credible evidence indicates that conditions have deteriorated markedly. At the end of August, the number of persons reportedly displaced since the resumption of hostilities in December 1998 reached over 3 million and approximately 1.3 million of them have been confirmed by humanitarian organizations. Provinces with the largest concentrations of internally displaced persons include Bié, Huíla, Huambo and Malanje. Since March, more than 165,000 persons have been displaced by war-related activity and food insecurity. The April floods in southern Angola and attacks during May led to the temporary displacement of between 90,000 to 110,000 people during a three-month period. In addition, growing insecurity in the northern part of Uige province during July and August forced at least 10,000 Angolan refugees to seek safety in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

26. The intensification of warfare produced very serious conditions in Bié province. In Camacupa, global malnutrition rates exceeded 41 per cent in four sites in April and reached as high as 46.6 per cent at the Descasque de Arroz transit centre. By the end of April, agencies were estimating that at least 40 per cent of all affected children in Camacupa were at mortal risk. Mortality levels at therapeutic feeding centres in nearby Kuito reached 24 per cent during early June, before receding at the end of the month. Despite intermittent insecurity, a new corridor into Camacupa was opened in April and a major humanitarian operation launched, involving large-scale distributions of food and survival items and emergency interventions in nutrition, health, and water and sanitation. By mid-July, as a result of humanitarian assistance, global malnutrition rates had dropped significantly in both Camacupa and Kuito. Although conditions in the two locations remained relatively stable from July onwards, displaced persons from inaccessible areas of Bié province continued to arrive in both locations through September. In Camacupa, the number of newly displaced persons increased from 8,000 in June to more than 23,000 by mid-September.

27. In May, humanitarian agencies identified 14 inaccessible areas where critical conditions were suspected. During the next several months, populations coming from interior locations within Bié and other provinces reported extreme levels of malnutrition in the inaccessible areas of Cuemba, Ringoma, Umpulo and Munhango in Bié province and Mussende in Kwanza Sul province. By August, the number of locations had increased to 20, indicating a marked and general deterioration in inaccessible areas. The number of at-risk persons residing in these locations was estimated at more than 200,000. Although government authorities promised to deliver direct front-line assistance to all hard-hit inaccessible areas, in particular Cuemba and Mussende, so far only minimal amounts have reportedly reached the most critically affected populations.

28. During July, representatives of the Government and humanitarian organizations conducted the annual Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs in 29 accessible areas in 12 provinces. The most critical conditions were found among internally displaced persons in transit centres, newly displaced persons and residents without livelihoods. Although some populations with access to agricultural land benefited from the harvest in April and May, the Rapid Assessment found that the overwhelming majority of displaced persons did not have access to adequate land and were unable to cultivate sufficient quantities of food stocks to cover basic food requirements. Malnutrition rates were highest in areas with large influxes of newly displaced populations including Cuima and Chipipa (Huambo province), Ganda and Cubal (Benguela province) and Luena (Moxico province). Malnutrition rates were also high among resident populations whose coping strategies had come under extreme pressure. Although needs were found in all of the 29 locations, acute needs were concentrated in four provinces (Bié province, Moxico province, northern Huíla province and central Benguela Province). The Rapid Assessment indicated that, if humanitarian assistance is withdrawn or

reduced, acute conditions could quickly develop in two additional provinces, Huambo and Malanje.

29. During the period under review, morbidity and mortality rates continued to be high in many areas, especially among recently displaced populations in crowded camps and transit centres. Malaria, anaemia, acute respiratory infections and diarrhoeic diseases remained the most prevalent illnesses and causes of death. The precarious health situation was exacerbated by limited supplies of essential medicines and understaffed health facilities. These conditions lead to outbreaks of preventable diseases, including measles in Uíge province and meningitis in Benguela province.

30. The overall humanitarian situation was exacerbated by heavy rains and flooding during March and April. Tens of thousands of people in coastal zones and other areas lost their homes and agricultural fields, particularly in the central province of Bengula, and the southern provinces of Cunene, Huíla and Namibe. Access to affected areas was severely restricted owing to flooded surface routes, collapsed bridges and damaged railroad connections. Under the joint leadership of the Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UTCAH) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, technical assessments were rapidly conducted in 15 flood-affected areas. During the next three months, humanitarian partners implemented a consolidated plan of action aimed at stabilizing conditions and re-establishing livelihoods. In addition, the Government released resources to repair damaged infrastructure.

31. Three rounds of National Immunization Days (NIDs) against poliomyelitis were conducted during the reporting period (July, August and September). The July NID was the first synchronized campaign to be held in conjunction with neighbouring countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. Despite significant improvements in vaccination coverage, more than 20 municipalities were not reached and large parts of 48 others were not properly covered during the July campaign. During the August campaign, 19 municipalities were not reached.

Access and security

32. Contrary to expectations, access to at-risk populations, particularly in new areas, did not increase during the reporting period. Security perimeters around provincial cities and towns remained restricted and in six areas (Moxico, Bié, Malanje, Uíge, Bengo and Kuando Kubango) perimeters contracted under intense pressure. Road links between capitals remained insecure in the central and eastern parts of the country and only one new surface corridor to Camacupa was established.

33. Airstrips in Luena, Kuito Kuanavale, Uíge and Kuito remained in poor condition. Despite the Government's commitment to immediately repairing the Kuito airstrip, progress was slow. WFP was able to deliver only 60 per cent of requirements to Kuito. In May, lack of fuel for air operations out of the Catumbela hub (Benguela province) hampered the delivery of assistance to areas throughout the country. In Malanje, de-mining and resettlement activities also had to be reduced owing to fuel shortages.

34. Security conditions remained volatile. More than 300 armed attacks occurred on commercial convoys, resettlement sites, and population centres. A 5 May attack against Caxito, the capital of Bengo province, located 60 kilometres from Luanda, caused the temporary displacement of between 50,000 and 70,000 people in the direction of Luanda. During the attack, an undetermined number of civilians were killed, including four non-governmental humanitarian workers. Forty-nine humanitarian personnel were immediately relocated to Luanda. At least 60 children, 1 teacher and an unconfirmed number of adult civilians were abducted. On 25 May, 60 children and 2 adults were released in Kwanza Norte province. An additional 35 children remained unaccounted for following the attack.

35. On 21 May, Golungo Alto (Kwanza Norte province) was attacked, resulting in the displacement of more than 4,000 persons towards the provincial capital, N'Dalatando. Several national humanitarian workers were captured, but later released. During June, insecurity and fighting occurred within and in close proximity to six provincial capitals, including Uíge, Kuito, Saurimo, N'Dalatando, Huambo and Malanje. On 28 June, Uíge was attacked. Forty-three United Nations and non-governmental humanitarian personnel were relocated to Luanda for approximately two weeks. In mid-September, attacks against Muxaluando (Bengo province) caused at least 12,000 people to seek safety in Caxito.

36. In June, attacks occurred against two clearly marked WFP cargo aircraft over Luena (Moxico province) and Kuito (Bié province). WFP flights were suspended for seven days following the attacks. The cancellation of flights hampered the humanitarian relief effort in Angola, creating a backlog for both passenger and cargo flights. Mine contamination also restricted humanitarian operations and continued to cause serious human suffering. During the period under review, more than 200 people were killed or injured as a result of mine incidents in 15 provinces.

Protection

37. Protection problems remained a serious concern, particularly in militarily contested areas where counter-insurgency and guerrilla warfare aimed directly at civilian populations have resulted in widespread abuses. During the period, violations included forced displacement, abductions, looting of property, harassment, physical assault and under-age recruitment. Between 70 and 90 per cent of the people of Angola lack official documentation or proof of identity.

38. As part of ongoing efforts to develop pragmatic protection mechanisms, seven protection workshops were held at the provincial level. A Luanda-based team with representatives from the Attorney-General's office, FAA, the Angolan National Police, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNHCR and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) led the workshops. The purpose was to sensitize key actors on humanitarian principles and develop a concrete provincial protection plan. Each workshop included 30 to 40 representatives of government ministries, FAA, Angolan National Police, the Attorney-General's office, national and international non-governmental organizations, religious and community organizations and United Nations agencies. By the end of August, 10 provincial protection plans had been developed and 6 formally approved in Malanje, Benguela, Bié, Zaire, Kuando Kubango and Kwanza Norte provinces. In three provinces, Benguela, Bié and Kuando Kubango, protection sub-groups have been formed and are now functioning.

Resettlement and return

39. Contrary to expectations, large-scale resettlement was not possible during the period owing to deteriorating security conditions. Although partners had planned to relocate 500,000 internally displaced persons during the year, only 67,000 people were resettled between March and September in approximately 15 sites. In a worrying trend, resettlement sites came under increasing attack. Between April and mid-August, 33 separate attacks occurred, including several in areas previously considered safe (Dombe Grande, Cubal, Cacula, Golungo Alto, Caxito and Uíge city).

40. Approximately 50 per cent of all resettlement initiatives during the period were carried out in compliance with the preconditions described in the Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Populations. The Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs indicated ongoing problems with compliance in Kwanza Norte, Huila, Malanje, Moxico, Namibe, Kuando Kubango, Lunda Sul, Cunene, Benguela and Huambo provinces. In August, the *regulamento* (operating procedures) for implementing the Norms was finalized, following six months of intensive consultations. The aim of the *regulamento* is to establish legally binding procedures that guarantee the standardized application of the Norms countrywide and identify benchmarks for the monitoring of the resettlement process. Following dissemination of the *regulamento*, compliance with the Norms is expected to improve significantly in the months ahead.

41. As part of a major ongoing effort to improve living conditions for the most affected internally displaced persons, more than 30 transit centres have been closed since April 2000 and the persons involved (approximately 20,000 people) resettled in temporary sites. During the period under review, four transit centres were closed (two in Ganda in Benguela province and two in Luena in Moxico province) and 1,500 people were resettled. In addition, one transit centre was upgraded into a reception facility in Balombo (Benguela province). By mid-September, 13 transit centres were still open, although efforts were under way to close more by the end of the year.

42. Agencies estimate that approximately 60,000 internally displaced persons returned to their areas of origin during the reporting period in the provinces of Bié, Huambo, Huila, Malanje and Moxico. In addition,

spontaneous return movements, of unknown size, reportedly occurred in several inaccessible areas. In Bengo, Malanje and Uige provinces, thousands of returned populations were again displaced owing to upsurges in insecurity.

Food security

43. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment conducted in May confirmed that seeds and tools had been distributed in larger quantities during 2000-2001 than the previous year. In addition, most people had improved access to agricultural areas. According to data provided by the food security office of the Ministry of Agriculture, residents and internally displaced persons had cultivated approximately 2,120,000 hectares of land during the last agricultural season. The most significant increases in cultivated areas were recorded in Huambo, Huila, Uige and Kwanza Sul provinces. As a result, overall production was higher than the previous year, despite dry spells in the northern region and floods in the southern provinces.

44. Between March and September 2001, WFP planned to distribute an average of 13,186 metric tons per month to 896,309 beneficiaries in 17 provinces. Insecurity, fuel shortages, airport closures and repairs, and scarcity of some commodities contributed to a shortfall in the actual distributions during the period. In April, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reduced its caseload in Huambo from 328,000 to 28,000 beneficiaries. In March, WFP introduced a new system of registration aimed at the better targeting of beneficiaries. By June, approximately 40,000 newly displaced families had been registered under the new system.

Coordination of humanitarian assistance

45. Positive advances in coordination continued during the reporting period. In mid-March, the senior inter-agency network on internal displacement, led by the United Nations Special Coordinator on Internal Displacement, together with representatives of FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, the Office of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, and the non-governmental organizations community, undertook a mission to Angola. The mission assessed the nature and magnitude of the assistance and protection needs of internally displaced persons and reviewed the operational capacity of humanitarian actors. The team also reviewed progress made in implementing the recommendations made by the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, following his visit to Angola in November 2000. The mission, which had met with government representatives and a broad cross section of humanitarian partners and visited internally displaced persons locations in Bié, Huambo and Luanda provinces, expressed concern over allegations of human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, including forced relocation, targeting of civilians, forced conscription, looting of humanitarian supplies and sexual violence.

46. The Executive Director of UNICEF, Ms. Carol Bellamy, visited Angola in August. The purpose of the mission was to support the polio eradication campaign and help launch a new birth registration campaign. In addition, the Executive Director undertook an assessment of the situation of children in Angola and, at the request of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, reviewed general humanitarian conditions. Following meetings with government officials and humanitarian partners and field visits to Bié, Cabinda and Malanje provinces, the Executive Director expressed serious concern about the poor level of education for children and stressed the importance of expanded access and increased government resources for the social sectors.

47. In a positive step forward, the Humanitarian Coordination Group, co-chaired by the Minister of Social Affairs and Reintegration and the Humanitarian Coordinator a.i., met in Luanda in April to discuss the humanitarian situation in the country. On the basis of a new information-sharing format, jointly prepared at the field level by government representatives and OCHA, UTCAH presented an overview of the humanitarian situation in all 18 provinces focusing on critical needs and outlining a two-month work plan for each province. Priorities and work plans for the three national sub-groups on food security and agriculture, health and nutrition, and internally displaced persons and refugees were also presented.

48. In April, the second National Plan of Emergency Action was drafted under the leadership of UTCAH. The Plan, prepared by 11 ministries and departments, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, focused on government actions in seven sectors and established an overall framework for humanitarian interventions from May 2001 to May 2002. In August, more than 210 government delegates and United Nations field staff attended the second provincial planning workshop from all 18 provinces. During September, provincial emergency plans of action were drafted in each province under government leadership. The provincial plans identified humanitarian priorities for each province and outlined the concrete steps that partners would be taking during the coming year. To ensure complementarities between government and United Nations interventions, the provincial plans will form the basis of the 2002 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal.

49. In mid-August, the Government announced the creation of the Intersectoral Commission on De-mining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) under the Council of Ministers. The Commission will be responsible for coordinating de-mining activities as well as assistance to mine victims. Members include representatives of the Ministries of Social Affairs and Reinsertion, Health, Agriculture and Rural Development, Territorial Administration, External Relations, Defence and the Interior, and of FAA and six representatives from national and international non-governmental organizations.

V. Economic and social situation

50. During the period under review, there was some progress towards achieving greater macroeconomic stability, although many of the macroeconomic targets set in the Staff Monitored Programme (SMP) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were not met. For example, the annual rate of inflation fell to 173 per cent in June 2001, compared with more than 400 per cent a year earlier, but this was still above the June target of 150 per cent set in the SMP. The inflation rate fell to 131 per cent in August.

51. The reduction in inflation appears to have occurred despite a continuing large budget deficit, and was made possible only by central bank action to contain depreciation of the kwanza by selling foreign exchange on the local market. As a result, the Government was unable to meet the SMP target for international reserves and exceeded the SMP ceiling on external borrowing. In August, the Government contracted a new oil-guaranteed loan of US$ 600 million from a consortium of international banks, further adding to the stock of costly commercial loans to be repaid by future oil deliveries.

52. Oil exports (almost US$ 7 billion in 2000) are believed to have fallen slightly in 2001, owing to a relatively minor weakening of oil prices and a temporary pause in the long-term trend of rising oil production, which is currently about 740,000 barrels a day. However, the start-up of production of the major new Girassol Field at the end of this year will raise oil production to a projected 950,000 barrels a day in 2002. The large increase in oil exports should ease budgetary and balance-of-payments pressures significantly, assuming no large fall in world oil prices.

53. The SMP, which had begun in July 2000, ended in June 2001. The main objectives of the programme were to restore macroeconomic stability, improve transparency in public sector operations and begin implementation of a series of structural reforms. Following a monitoring mission by IMF in July, the Fund reported that there had been some progress in the implementation of the structural measures, including the start-up of a diagnostic study of the oil sector, but that many of the measures had not yet been completed. It also noted that urgent action was required to improve the production and publication of data on government revenues, expenditures and external debt transactions. Although the SMP has formally ended, at the Government's request, the deadline for implementation of the SMP measures has been extended to October 2001. IMF and the authorities agreed that discussions on a possible Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility could begin once the objectives of the SMP had been achieved.

54. One of the SMP measures has been the preparation of an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP). Following the Government's completion of a first draft in February 2001, the United Nations system in Angola prepared a memorandum on the draft I-PRSP, based on comments and suggestions made by each of the United Nations agencies. This memorandum was submitted to the Minister of Planning by the Resident Coordinator a.i. on 2 May. The Government is continuing work on the I-PRSP and has requested technical assistance from the United

Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank for its completion. However, apart from a seminar on the social sectors and poverty reduction, hosted by the Ministry of Planning on 18 and 19 July, consultations with the civil society and the National Assembly on the poverty reduction strategy have not yet begun.

55. At the July seminar, the Government released preliminary data from the Household Expenditure and Income Survey, 2000/2001, conducted by the National Statistics Institute, which confirmed the seriousness of the poverty situation. The data, which are almost entirely for the urban areas and do not include some of the worst war-affected areas, showed that 63 per cent of households were living below the poverty line. Most disturbing of all, 25 per cent of households were below the extreme poverty line, equivalent to about 60 United States cents per adult per day (enough to meet only basic calorific food needs).

56. In a move that aroused considerable controversy, including protests from those directly affected, the provincial government of Luanda has begun the demolition of the homes of an estimated 50,000 residents in the slum district of Boavista, citing the risks of erosion in the area, and the relocation to a settlement about 40 kilometres outside the city, where they have been provided with tents. The demolition of homes and relocation of the residents began in July and are continuing in phases, despite protests from the Boavista residents committee and human rights lawyers assisting the residents, who complain that they were not consulted, are not receiving compensation for the loss of assets and have been removed by force to a site far from their sources of employment and incomes.

57. The campaign to eradicate polio has continued, with the third round of National Immunization Days (NID) held from 14 to 16 September, with support from the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and other international partners. Data from the Ministry of Health for the second round of NID, held from 11 to 13 August, indicate that almost 3.6 million children under age 5, out of a target population of 3.8 million, were vaccinated in 123 out of 164 local government areas (*municipios*). However, owing to increased difficulties in access, there was a slight reduction in geographical coverage compared with that of the first NID held from 6 to 8 July, when 139 *municipios* had been reached. Nonetheless, Angola appears to be well on the way to achieving polio eradication, if the campaign is sustained, if routine immunization services are strengthened and if this is supported by an effective epidemiological surveillance system. Since September 2000, no cases of wild polio virus have been confirmed.

VI. Observations

58. At the beginning of the year, there was a glimmer of hope that the conflict might be giving way to what appeared to be a dialogue that could lead the parties towards a peaceful settlement of their differences. Unfortunately, the intensification and the frequency of the guerrilla attacks by UNITA, particularly on innocent civilians, including women and children, plunged the country into another political and military stalemate.

59. However, there are encouraging signs towards the resolution of the conflict and civil society continues to spearhead the call for a political settlement. In fact, both the Government and UNITA have reaffirmed the validity of the Lusaka Protocol as a basis for peace in Angola, although they still hold different interpretations with respect to the ways and means by which the relevant provisions of the Protocol are to be implemented. The United Nations and the international community should continue to exert their influence and assist the parties in finding lasting peace within the framework of the Protocol.

60. The ongoing conflict continues to heavily affect the human rights situation in Angola, particularly in the provinces and areas affected by guerrilla warfare. In addition to ongoing institution- and capacity-building activities in Luanda, several initiatives have been taken to support activities in the provinces. The humanitarian situation also remains serious, particularly in inaccessible regions, where deterioration of conditions is suspected. While the humanitarian agencies continue their support activities in all regions, I call upon the Government and the international community to extend humanitarian assistance, in particular to the civilian populations in the inaccessible areas.

61. At the request of the Government of Angola, my Adviser for Special Assignments in Africa will be visiting Angola later in the year for consultation with the Government, political parties and civil society representatives on how best the United Nations could help in the search for a negotiated peace in the country.

He will also consult on the Government's request for the Organization's support and assistance with respect to the elections to take place in late 2002 or 2003, the pilot project and the Fund for Peace and National Reconciliation.

62. Through the efforts of UNOA and in particular of my Adviser for Special Assignments in Africa, as well as my Representative in Angola, broad contacts have been established with the Government, political parties, civil society, and the church which could provide a strong support base in the common search for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. UNOA continues to play an essential role in providing assistance to the Government and people of Angola in the area of human rights and capacity-building, as well as in the crucial area of humanitarian aid. In addition to monitoring the situation on the ground, UNOA portrays in significant ways the continuing commitment of the international community to the pressing cause of peace, harmony and prosperity in Angola. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNOA for a further six-month period, until 15 April 2002.

United Nations S/2001/957

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 10 October 2001 from the Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to transmit herewith resolution No. 6115, dated 10 September 2001, entitled "Solidarity with the Republic of Lebanon", which was adopted by the League of Arab States Council of Ministers at its one hundred and sixteenth regular session, held on 9 and 10 September 2001 at the League of Arab States headquarters in Cairo.

I should be grateful if you would draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to this letter and its annex, and have them circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Hussein **Hassouna**
Ambassador

01-57506 (E) 101001 101001

Annex to the letter dated 10 October 2001 from the Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Solidarity with Lebanon

The Council of Ministers of the League of Arab States,

Having considered the note of the General Secretariat, the note of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon and the recommendation of the Political Affairs Committee,

Referring to resolution No. 205 of 28 March 2001, adopted at the Arab Summit of Amman held in March 2001, paragraph 6 of which deals with the question of activating the Lebanon Support Fund to assist the Government of Lebanon to rebuild and develop the country, especially the areas freed from Israeli occupation, and of supporting the request which Lebanon addressed to the States members of the League asking them to adopt and finance development and other projects in south Lebanon and the western Bekaa,

1. Strongly condemns Israel, which continues to occupy Lebanese territory and positions on the Lebanese frontier, still detains Lebanese in its prisons, refuses to hand over to the United Nations all the maps indicating the location of mines laid by the forces of occupation and continues to infringe the sovereignty of Lebanon, on land, on sea and in the air; denounces the Israeli attacks and threats against Lebanon and Syria; and considers that any attack against these two countries will be deemed an attack against the Arab nation;

2. Reaffirms its support for Lebanon, which:

(a) Seeks to liberate the rest of its territory, including the farms of Shab'a, from Israeli occupation as far as the internationally recognized frontiers, in accordance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978), while reserving the right to combat this occupation by all legitimate means;

(b) Demands the release of Lebanese prisoners and detainees who are being held as hostages in Israeli prisons in violation of the rules of international law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and The Hague Convention of 1907, while reserving the right to secure the release of these prisoners and detainees by all legitimate means;

(c) Demands the removal of the tens of thousands of mines abandoned by the Israeli occupier, and holds Israel responsible for laying these mines and for the deaths and injuries which they have caused among the civilian population;

(d) Reaffirms the right it has over its territorial waters, in accordance with international law, given the Israeli designs;

3. Requests the international community and the international political and judicial bodies:

(a) To prevail upon Israel to compensate Lebanon for the damage and losses suffered as a result of the repeated Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory before, during and after the occupation;

(b) To endeavour to arrange for representatives of ICRC and other humanitarian organizations to meet regularly with the Lebanese detainees and check on their situation, especially their health;

(c) To take steps to ensure that the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations adopts a resolution providing for an investigation into the deaths of persons held in Israeli prisons and the payment of compensation to those affected by such deaths, in accordance with international law and international conventions;

4. Reaffirms the right to return of Palestinian refugees and emphasizes that the failure to solve the question of the refugees living in Lebanon — by allowing them to return home in accordance with resolution 194 of 1949 — or the attempts to settle them will jeopardize security and stability in the region and constitute an obstacle to the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace;

5. Thanks the member States and the Arab funds which have provided assistance, especially financial aid, to the Government of Lebanon; requests the other States to fulfil the commitments made at Arab summit conferences with respect to assistance to Lebanon and its struggling people, the activation of the Lebanon Support Fund, and the provision of assistance to the Government of Lebanon to enable it to rebuild and develop the country, especially the areas freed from Israeli occupation; and supports the request which Lebanon addressed to the member States to adopt and finance development and other projects;

6. Establishes a mechanism to manage the Lebanon Support Fund;

7. Decides to finance the following two projects in south Lebanon and the western Bekaa:

(a) A project in the amount of approximately $15 million to equip four hospitals which the southern council has built in the towns of Qana, Bent Jubayl, Mays al-Jabal and Mashghara but which it has not been able to equip with the aid of local financing sources;

(b) A project in the amount of $20 million for the development of the Ayn al-Zarqaa waters in the western Bekaa to benefit the regions of Rashia al-Wadi, the western Bekaa, Marj'uyun and Bent Jubayl and in this way satisfy the drinking-water requirements of approximately 60 towns and villages.

United Nations S/2001/958

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 10 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am rather pleased that you are conducting the work of the Security Council during this crucial month of October.

During this period, the Security Council will not only hold a key meeting on Angola but in particular will deliberate on the work of the sanctions committee and the Monitoring Mechanism to which you have been dedicating so much of your time and great commitment. Sanctions are indeed the most valuable tool that the international community has put in place to assist Angola in returning to peace. Your dedication to peace in Angola has been the sound foundation on which the work of both the Committee and the Monitoring Mechanism stands. The people of Angola will be ever grateful to you when, tomorrow, we jointly celebrate peace in that country.

Please find attached the letter which the Minister of External Relations has addressed to you with the request that it be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ismael A. Gaspar **Martins**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-57630 (E) 111001

Annex to the letter dated 10 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Republic of Angola
Minister for External Relations

Luanda, 8 October 2001

In the coming days, the Security Council is going to discuss the question of Angola, based on the report to be submitted by the sanctions Committee set up under resolution 864 (1993). The Angolan Government considers this to be an opportunity for the members of the Security Council to make another assessment of the positive impact of the sanctions, which have significantly helped reduce the capability of the militarist wing of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) to wage war, and have also helped identify the mechanisms to ensure their full implementation.

The pressure put on UNITA's militarist wing by the international community in the political, diplomatic, financial, trade and immigration areas is showing positive results: UNITA's ability to acquire war materiel was seriously hampered, its armed attacks ceased to be a threat to the existence of Angolan democratic institutions and its activity today is reduced to acts of terrorism, such as the recent attack on a passenger train at Zena do Itombe, which killed more than 250 people, an act of terrorism that was strongly condemned by the Security Council, and also the attack on a power station in the town of Viana, near Luanda. An increasing number of members of UNITA's militarist wing have rejected the war path and are being integrated into society; the democratic process in Angola is being strengthened and our country's economy, although still in a crisis, is starting to show signs of revitalization.

For those reasons, my Government continues to advocate the need to keep the sanctions until the goals for which they were imposed are met, and that means until UNITA's militarist wing definitely rejects the option of violent action and embraces the path of peace in Angola.

We are convinced that an increased pressure by the international community on UNITA's militarist wing led by Mr. Savimbi will considerably increase its isolation and help force UNITA to abide by the Lusaka Protocol and to fulfil the pertinent Security Council resolutions, which are the instruments that set forth the framework for achieving peace in Angola.

Therefore, the Angolan Government believes that the time has come for the members of the Security Council to impose new restrictive measures against UNITA's militarist wing, namely in the area of telecommunications, under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations and paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1295 (2000).

At the same time, in order to ensure the full implementation and the success of this mission, it is crucial to secure an extension of the mechanism for the monitoring of the sanctions and the maintenance of the necessary human resources.

In the face of the hideous and barbaric nature of the systematic acts of violence perpetrated by the UNITA militarist wing against the defenceless civilian population

in Angola and against our country's economic and social infrastructure, with the destruction of roads, bridges, water treatment and power plants, farm land, etc., the Security Council should not abstain from making an assessment of the situation and taking a firm stand against those who are mainly responsible for these acts which can only be characterized as acts of terrorism, the kind against which the international community has united to combat and eradicate.

(*Signed*) João Bernardo **de Miranda**
Minister for External Relations of the Republic of Angola

United Nations A/56/461–S/2001/959

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 62
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 9 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 9 October 2001, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which contains, as its annex, the letter dated 10 September 2001 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Rauf Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Umit **Pamir**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-57685 (E) 191001

Annex to the letter dated 9 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to convey herewith a copy of the letter dated 10 September 2001 addressed to you by His Excellency, Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, concerning your mission of good offices (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you could have the present letter and its enclosures circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aytuğ **Plümer**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Enclosure 1

I hope that by now you have been informed of the reasons why I was not able to come to New York. I also hope you give me the benefit of your compassion by accepting my explanation that this is not intended to be a rebuff of your good self, for which, as you know I have the greatest respect and admiration.

It is because of my respect for you and your office that I feel obliged to take your time to detail our position.

It is most unfortunate that it was not possible to impress upon Mr. De Soto that it was premature to invite the two parties to New York for a meeting with you "for resuming the talks". The invitation, therefore, was not a personal invitation by you, it was "for resuming the talks". As I had told you at Salzburg, Austria, Greek Cypriot policy, actions and finally their reactions and unanimous rejection of your statement of 12 September 2000 (which we had received as formulating, in the most neutral and simple way, a framework for the talks) had left nothing, no common ground whatsoever from which to engage in invigorated meaningful talks. The wrong treatment of the Greek Cypriot side by all concerned as the legitimate government of Cyprus, and frequent statements to the effect that "agreement or not, Cyprus(!) will be accepted as a European Union (EU) member" has left no will and no wish on the part of the Greek Cypriot leadership to share anything with us!

To them, continuation of "the talks" is for the purpose of maintaining a platform from which they can project themselves as "a magnanimous government condescending to talk to its unruly minority, which is trying to partition the island by helping the invader". They have accordingly been seeking and getting help under the false pretence that the Cyprus problem arose as a result of occupation and will be settled when the occupier is kicked out of Cyprus and Greek Cypriot refugees return to their properties! We have been living with this false pretence for almost three decades now. In the meantime our politically equal status is denied; embargoes continue; military coupling with mother Greece is enhanced; EU countries are hoodwinked into believing that all will be well once Turkey or Denktaş are brought to line!

In spite of the available evidence and objections incessantly put forward by us showing that the problem arose as a result of planned action by the Greek Cypriot party in order to convert a partnership state into a Greek Cypriot state, the family of nations continue to treat the Greek Cypriot usurped title of the "Republic of Cyprus" as a unitary state within which the Turkish Cypriot minority(!) has misbehaved. Consequently, we are deprived of our right of being seen and heard on the basis of equality as a co-founder and partner of the 1960 Republic.

A brief look at developments in Cyprus since the planned destruction of the partnership Republic in 1963 can help us better understand the challenges and opportunities today.

December 1963: Turkish Cypriots are attacked. Constitutional order is destroyed. One hundred three villages are evacuated. Turkish Cypriot civil servants, ministers, members of Parliament are unable to go to their offices.

Makarios declares the agreements of 1960 to be abrogated. Under British pressure he retracts this statement but says the constitution is dead and buried. He declares he does not recognize Dr. Küçük as his Vice-President.

• 4 March 1964: United Nations Security Council resolves to send United Nations peacekeeping forces to Cyprus "to contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions". Turkish Cypriot leaders struggle to return to the 1960 constitutional order but the then Secretary-General of the United Nations unfortunately states, in his 10 September 1964 report (S/5950), that he does not interpret his mission to be the restoration of the constitutional situation.

Dr. Küçük's attempt to keep the constitution alive comes to naught because, in spite of all the crimes perpetrated against Turkish Cypriots, Makarios continues to be treated (together with his cabinet composed of 100 per cent Greek Cypriots) as the legitimate government of Cyprus!

The attempt of Turkish Cypriot parliamentarians to return to the House of Representatives on 22 July 1964 was rebuffed by the Speaker of the House (Mr. Clerides himself), who told the Turkish Cypriot parliamentarians that they could not enter the House unless they accept all the constitutional changes (including the abolition of the provision concerning separate majorities) unilaterally made by Greek Cypriot parliamentarians (United Nations Secretary-General's report of 10 September 1964, para. 108).

These were enough to convince Greek Cypriots that they had now achieved their objective of converting the partnership into a Greek Cypriot state. In the words of Mr. Clerides, they needed no solution thereafter because, whatever happened, they were "the government of Cyprus". According to Makarios this accomplishment of driving the Turkish Cypriot partner out of the partnership and discarding the Constitution of the land was "bringing Cyprus to the nearest point to Enosis".

Mr. Clerides' statement is very clear on this point:

> "Just as the Greek Cypriot preoccupation was that Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot state with a protected Turkish Cypriot minority, the Turkish preoccupation was to defeat any such effort and to maintain the partnership concept, which in their opinion the Zurich Agreement created between the two communities. The conflict, therefore, was a conflict of principle and for that principle both sides were prepared to go on arguing and even, if need be, to fight, rather than compromise.
>
> The same principle is still in conflict, even today, though a federal solution has been accepted — and though a federation is nothing more than a constitutional partnership of the component states, provinces or cantons which make up the federation."
>
> (Mr. Glafcos Clerides, My Deposition, vol. III, p. 105)

Ever since, Greek Cypriot policy has been not to have anyone cast any doubt on this self-assumed title of being the legitimate Government of Cyprus. And the conflict has arisen and remains unsettled because the Greek Cypriots are assured that their title will be protected at all costs. No one is interested in diagnosing the problem for what it is.

From 1963 to 1968 Makarios refused to meet what he regarded to be "the leader of the rebels" (namely his Vice-President Dr. Küçük), and he offered us minority rights.

The Greek Cypriot position was that there was no need for contacts or talks with the Turkish Cypriot party because they had already achieved their objective. Only the acceptance of minority status by the Turkish Cypriot party would create "ground" for the Greek Cypriot party — ground to finally give legality to their violent usurpation of power in 1963.

In 1968, I agreed with Mr. Clerides that the partnership established under the 1960 Agreements should be re-adjusted with regard to geography — hence talks began on the agreed common-ground of partnership based on local autonomy.

After six years of on and off talks, Makarios refused to give his approval to a settlement on grounds that I had not accepted minority status and was insisting on the Guarantee System of 1960.

After 1974, we agreed with Mr. Clerides that the two peoples could not live in an integrated fashion as before, hence the agreement of 1975 for voluntary exchange of population, which was monitored by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

For two years, Makarios, who was still in Athens and unable to return to Cyprus, objected to a bi-zonal federal settlement.

Under the pressure of realities on the island, he agreed, in 1977, to a federal partnership based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal settlement, but died within four months. At the core of that agreement were the restrictions on the three freedoms in order to give permanence to bi-zonality and thus discard Turkish Cypriot fears of domination.

Kyprianou, who replaced him, dragged his feet for another two years before he confirmed the 1977 Agreement: partnership, to be established on a geographical basis!

But he never believed in it and stalled each time we came to a near agreement.

He rejected the proposals of the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 1985 and 1986, based on partnership, and when he lost the elections in 1988 he publicly declared that he had never believed in a federal settlement and that he had done his national duty by protecting the title of the government of Cyprus (which was the nearest point to Enosis, as stated by Makarios).

In the meantime the Set of Ideas, envisaging a new partnership, was on the table.

Mr. Vassiliou pretended to talk on the basis of "a new partnership" until we came to the point of signing the Agreement. But his letter, to the effect that he would follow "the national policy of Mr. Kiprianou", published in the Greek Cypriot press, proved that the "national policy" of Greek Cypriot leaders would not and could not change. It was election year and Mr. Clerides was defying any agreement based on the Set of Ideas.

Mr. Vassiliou lost the elections. Mr. Clerides, who won the elections in 1992, refused to negotiate, arguing that there was no common ground on which to negotiate.

In 1994, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, I managed to come face to face with Mr. Clerides. He said he would talk to me if I agreed to

support the Greek Cypriot application for EU membership. He knew that I could not do so on political and legal grounds. So he refused to talk to me using the excuse that there was no common ground between us.

We lost another three years before you succeeded in bringing us together in 1997 at Troutback and Glion.

This time, Mr. Clerides rested his case on EU norms and rejected every parameter on the table.

With great difficulty we agreed to take part at the proximity talks in 2000.

At the end of the fourth round, you succeeded in giving us a neutral but acceptable framework with your statement of 12 September, which was immediately rejected by the Greek Cypriot side. This initial angry reaction to "a new partnership" was given full backing by the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives on 11 October 2000. A copy of this resolution, which I had given you in Salzburg, is attached for ease of reference (see enclosure 2).

As I tried to point out from the beginning, the purpose of the talks was for re-establishing *a new partnership*, but, the Greek Cypriot rejection of the partnership emanates from the encouragement they have received from the international community, and more recently from EU circles, to the effect that "the legitimate government of Cyprus has made a proper application and can become a member even if the Cyprus problem is not settled!". Further statements to the effect that Turkish Cypriots have no right of objection to such entry has enhanced the Greek Cypriot belief that they have truly become "the government of Cyprus" and that Turkish Cypriots have to tow the line whether they like it or not. All these have undermined the chances of success of your good offices mission aimed at the establishment of a new partnership based on the explicit recognition of the equal status of the two parties.

Having gone through this experience, and knowing well that Greek Cypriot policy is to consolidate their position as "the government of Cyprus", it is incumbent upon me, as the representative of my people, whose rights and status stand in great jeopardy, not to facilitate this trend, which is contrary to the rule of law and to all the realities appertaining to Cyprus. We must always bear in mind that we are dealing with the case of a usurped partnership, in which the party whose rights and status have been violated has succeeded to maintain its integrity and, as a result of the expression of the political will of its people, has, since 1963, evolved into a parallel democratic state.

After 38 years of failed negotiations, we, like you, are convinced that it is imperative to prepare the ground for meaningful negotiations. But we must see proof that the ground is really prepared if we are not going to engage in yet another futile exercise. It is because of this that we are insisting on "common ground" regarding the objective (the establishment of a new partnership) and guiding principles (the equal status of the parties and that neither can represent the other nor the whole of Cyprus) before we start a new phase of reinvigorated and meaningful negotiations.

I trust and believe that through your good offices you will be able to convince Mr. Clerides that I am as justified, if not more so than he was, when he adamantly refused to start negotiations with me on the ground that there was nothing in common to talk about. During those years the Set of Ideas was on the table together

with all the Agreements we had made. Now his readiness for talks cannot be accepted by me as a sincere gesture of good-will, especially in the light of the fact that he has admitted to his press that he attends talks simply for tactical reasons, the tactic being to say yes to everything to which the Turkish Cypriot side says no.

Mr. Secretary-General,

I would like to confirm again that, as you have outlined in your statement of 12 September 2000, the Turkish Cypriot party is very much interested in the establishment of a new partnership in Cyprus that will recognize and be based on the equal status of its two constituting parties. If the Greek Cypriot party also feels the same way, and can make the same commitment, we would have together made a significant leap forward and would have opened the door for reinvigorated and meaningful talks. Peace, security and stability in the island and in the region need a freely negotiated agreement between the two sovereign equal parties. Healthy EU enlargement and the membership of "Cyprus" in the EU all depend on the negotiated agreement.

The recognition by the British Parliament of the separate right of self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot people and of the Greek Cypriot people twice, once in 1956 and once in 1958, prepared the ground for the establishment of the 1960 partnership Republic.

This time round, the securing of a commitment from both parties that the purpose of the United Nations-facilitated talks is the establishment of a new partnership, to be explicitly based on the equal status of the two parties, would have prepared the ground for the reinvigorated phase of the talks for which you are calling.

I look forward to a confirmation of such a commitment from the Greek Cypriot side, either through you or through Mr. De Soto, and to engaging in meaningful negotiations within the framework of your mission of good offices.

(*Signed*) Rauf R. **Denktaş**
President

Enclosure 2

Resolution of the House of Representatives

11 October 2000

At an extraordinary session today, the House of Representatives discussed the latest developments in the Cyprus problem and, in particular, the developments at the fourth round of proximity talks, which were held in New York from the end of September to the beginning of October 2000.

The House of Representatives concludes that the opening statement of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, falls outside the letter and spirit of the framework of the talks and the basis of a solution of the Cyprus problem as determined by the United Nations principles, decisions and resolutions.

It also establishes that the non-papers that the United Nations Secretary-General's representative, Mr. de Soto, presented to the representatives of the two communities contain ideas and proposals that are not in line with the framework of principles and United Nations resolutions.

Taking all the above into account, the House of Representatives:

1. Reiterates its firm insistence on a s lution of the Cyprus problem based on the United Nations resolutions and decisions and the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements. A bi-communal, bi-zonal federation constitutes our ultimate and painful concession and not a starting position for negotiations aiming at the finding of a "middle-of-the-road settlement". It must safeguard the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the Cypriot people — Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians and Latins — and envisage the restoration of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State of Cyprus and the withdrawal of the occupation troops and settlers.

2. Calls upon the United Nations Secretariat to repeat and reaffirm that the talks are being held on the basis of the United Nations resolutions and the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements and to make the necessary corrective moves.

3. Appeals to various mediators who are guiding or supporting the United Nations intervention in the Cyprus problem to uphold with greater strictness, firmness and consistency the principles of the United Nations, the provisions of their decisions and resolutions on Cyprus, the high-level agreements and the acquis communautaire.

It is a basic and fundamental principle of the talks that any proposals or ideas should be fully in line with the acquis communautaire.

4. Declares that it rejects any proposals and ideas containing the seeds of confederation or the establishment of two states, and calls upon the President of the Republic to repeat clearly in all directions that he will neither accept nor discuss a framework for the solution of the Cyprus problem containing confederal elements.

5. Calls upon, at the same time, the President of the Republic to continue and intensify his efforts in the direction of a full correction of the situation created by the United Nations Secretary-General's opening statement and in reaffirming the basis of the talks and the framework for a solution, as these are determined by the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and the two high-level agreements.

6. Calls upon the President of the Republic to continue and intensify the initiatives and handling, which will substantively and effectively support the agreed targets set by the National Council and the accepted procedures and handling for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

7. Considers that there is an imperative need for the National Council to study and analyse in depth current developments concerning the Cyprus problem and, on the basis of the assessments and conclusions to be drawn, to consult with the Greek Government so as to determine the tactics and further handling of our national problem, aiming always at a workable and viable solution.

United Nations S/2001/960

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 October 2001

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Letter dated 5 October 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I wish to refer to my report to the Security Council on Guinea-Bissau of 27 September 2001 (S/2001/915), which focused on the latest developments in that country and on the contributions of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) to the country's peace consolidation efforts.

In that report, I stated that despite some positive developments, the overall situation in Guinea-Bissau remained dangerously unstable, and I called for the critical support of the international community.

The authorities of Guinea-Bissau, in recent discussions with my Representative, have commended the work of UNOGBIS and have requested the extension of its mandate until the next legislative and presidential elections.

In that light, I propose that the mandate of UNOGBIS, which expires on 31 December 2001, be extended until 31 December 2002.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

01-57853 (E) 121001

United Nations S/2001/961

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 10 October 2001 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 5 October 2001 (S/2001/960) concerning your proposal that the current mandate of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), which expires on 31 December 2001, be extended to 31 December 2002, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the proposal contained in your letter.

(*Signed*) Richard **Ryan**
President of the Security Council

01-57872 (E) 121001

United Nations A/56/462–S/2001/962

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda items 21 (d), 25, 41, 42, 43, 118 and 166

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations: cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations

Question of Palestine

The situation in the Middle East

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Right of peoples to self-determination

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Letter dated 11 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the following documents of the ninth Extraordinary Session of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), held at Doha, Qatar, on 10 October 2001:

I. Text of the address of His Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar, Chairman of the Ninth Islamic Summit Conference of OIC, at the opening of the session (annex I);

II. Text of the final communiqué (annex II).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 21 (d), 25, 41, 42, 43, 118 and 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nassir Abdulaziz **Al-Nasser**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-57796 (E) 171001 191001

Annexes to the letter dated 11 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

Annex I

Address of His Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar, Chairman of the Ninth Islamic Summit Conference, at the opening meeting of the ninth extraordinary session of the OIC Foreign Ministers, held at Doha on 10 October 2001

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Your Excellency Brother Yassir Arafat, President of the State of Palestine,

Your Highness and Excellencies,

Your Excellency Dr. Abdul Wahid Belkziz, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

Representatives of Arab and Islamic Organizations in the United States of America,

Honourable guests,

This meeting is held in the wake of very grave events that will certainly have wide repercussions on the international situation and the Muslim nation for a long time to come. The expected American military action on Afghanistan, backed by the support of the allied States, was launched on the seventh of this month as a response to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington last month, which shook the whole world with the heavy losses of the lives of innocent people, and the extensive destruction of a number of public and private properties it caused in the United States of America.

The consequences of this terrorist act and the military response to it will be casting their shadows on the entire world and presenting immense challenges not only to our Islamic countries but also to the whole international community. All this makes it incumbent upon us to meet for consultation on what we have to do to face up to these circumstances and on ways of dealing with their causes and consequences.

Allow me, on this occasion, to extend on your behalf to the people and Government of the United States of America our deep condolences and sincere sympathy and to stress our strongest condemnation of what has happened and our denunciation of these ignominious acts and the killing of the innocent and terrorizing of the peaceful. Such acts are contrary to all human values, international customs and heavenly laws and religions, including our true Islamic creed which advocates peace among human beings and urges tolerance, love and equality and not enmity and hatred.

While stressing our unequivocal rejection of these acts, we find that countering them should not affect innocent civilians and should not extend to any but those who carried out those attacks. This requires providing conclusive evidence against the culprits. The military action should be exclusively confined to the perpetrators after the release of such evidence, so that the international community can determine its position with discernment and substantiated evidence. Innocent peoples should not be the ones who eventually have to pay. This places on all of us considerable responsibility towards the Afghan people, who have suffered for long decades from wars and conflicts that have displaced millions of their sons and completely destroyed their infrastructure. The Ninth OIC Summit Conference, held at Doha, affirmed the urgent need to set up a fund to extend aid to the people of Afghanistan under the auspices of OIC. I think it is high time that a decision was taken to establish this fund, for which I announce here the contribution of the State of Qatar the sum of US$ 10 million.

Dear brothers,

Stating our position on these events, particular those that directly affect us as Muslims and those that affect us as members of the international community, requires that we point out first of all that our true religion holds human life high and respects the right of people to live in peace and security.

Islam is a religion of peace; its greeting is peace. Even at times when the Muslims were at their strongest

and most powerful, it pursued the course of peace and tolerance and upheld the rights of non-Muslims living under Islamic rule. It guaranteed their security and their sanctities and sacred places as well as their full civil rights.

Hence our condemnation of terrorism is not aimed at removing suspicion from Islam; it is denunciation of extremism, which exists throughout human societies and is not confined to a specific creed, culture or race. Moreover, it is necessary for countering extremism to address its causes that stir hatred and lead to violence.

Dear brothers,

The Islamic world was among the first to call for dialogue among civilizations as a means for interaction, agreement and rapprochement of their peoples, instead of falling into conflicting sects and opposing camps and being divided by clashing dichotomies based on the principle of "If you are not on my side, then you are against me". It is known to all that the United Nations General Assembly will soon issue an international document on dialogue among civilizations on the basis of an Islamic initiative and with reference to Islamic studies and documents which will be pivotal to this document.

This proves that the Islamic world has always been an active part of the international community on account of its civilization being one of international orientation, far removed from isolationism, introversion, xenophobia or antagonism to other civilizations or feeling the necessity of fighting or taking revenge on them.

Moreover, the Organization of the Islamic Conference was a forerunner in adopting a firm position on terrorism. Several years ago it arrived at a code for combating international terrorism, which was later included in a draft convention which the Islamic countries were invited to endorse.

Dear brothers,

Examination of past experiences allows us to arrive at formulas that would enable us to counter this hateful phenomenon, which does not differentiate between one race or another, nor recognize political or geographic boundaries or social or economic doctrines. The first thing that this requires is to work more for activating the role of the United Nations as the framework which holds together all countries of the world and represents international legality based on its Charter, which basically aims at maintaining international peace and security. To that end, the United Nations should call for an international conference to draft an international convention on combating terrorism that will be binding on all countries. The United Nations must carry out its full responsibilities for the codification of the provisions of that convention, its implementation, putting it into effect and setting the penalties for violation of its provisions, so that the combating of international terrorism is carried out under the United Nations umbrella and command, in accordance with the criteria agreed upon, the most important of which is the definition of terrorism and distinguishing between terrorism, on the one hand, and the struggle of peoples against foreign occupation and their legitimate right to defend their freedom and exercise self-determination as a natural right guaranteed by international law and customs on the other.

From this standpoint, the Palestinian people in their struggle for the liberation of their homeland are practising a lawful right in resisting the occupation that has usurped the land, displaced its people and imposed a policy of starvation and siege and the assassination of leading political figures, in its continuing attempts to stifle the freedom of these people and suppress their independence.

The international community should not permit the recent events in the United States of America to distract it from its role and blind it to shouldering its responsibilities towards the State terrorism practised by the Israeli Government against the Palestinian people, its grave escalation of the situation in the region and its attempt to exploit these events to create new situations in the region that would threaten security and stability.

The atrocities perpetrated against the Palestinian people are nothing but organized terrorism practised by the Israeli State against unarmed people who have no alternative other than resistance in defence of their rights, the protection of their holy places and standing up against the humiliation, oppression, killings and displacement inflicted upon them.

I must state here that there are voices in our Islamic Nation which spell out that State terrorism begets terrorist organizations, and that violence breeds violence. The only way to break this vicious circle is to grant the Palestinian people their legitimate rights,

foremost among which is their right to self-determination and the establishment of their independent State on their national soil, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital.

From this standpoint, we call upon the international community, *and primarily the* United States of America, which is also one of the co-sponsors of the peace process along with the Russian Federation, as well as upon all influential international parties, to shoulder their responsibilities and provide the required international protection for the Palestinian people in the face of the Israeli war machine, as a preliminary step towards the resumption of the peace process on its original bases, in accordance with the resolutions of international legality and the principle of "land for peace".

I should like, on this occasion, to express satisfaction at the statements, in this respect, made by the United States President George Bush when he spoke of establishing the Palestinian State as being part of the strategic American vision of settling the conflict in our region. This position represents, in our view, a positive development of great importance, which will put things on their true course. We cannot but express the hope that the United States will move quickly to put this position into effect and seek to attain this strategic goal in the framework of the relevant international resolutions adopted in this connection so as to make it possible to pave the way for bringing about comprehensive, durable and just peace for all peoples and States in the region.

I must also commend the fair and responsible position taken by the United States President and the leaders of the European States in opposing attempts to exploit those tragic events to falsely accuse the Arabs and Muslims of terrorism, as well as their stand against those dubious attempts to insult Arabs and Muslims.

Dear brothers,

You are most welcome in your country. I hope that your meeting will bring about a unified position on the extremely grave events that are taking place in the world today. I beseech Almighty God to bestow success on you for the good of our Islamic Nation and the whole world.

May the peace, mercy and blessings of God be upon you.

Annex II

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Final communique of the ninth extraordinary session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Doha, Qatar on 10 October 2001

At the gracious invitation of His Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar and Chairman of the Ninth Islamic Summit Conference, the Foreign Ministers of the States members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference held an extraordinary session at Doha, capital of the State of Qatar, on Wednesday, 10 October 2001, to discuss the repercussions of the events which took place in the United States of America and their effects worldwide and in particular on member States.

The Conference was opened by His Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar and Chairman of the Ninth Islamic Summit Conference, who delivered an address in which he referred to the situation that resulted from the recent terrorist attacks in the United States of America and its consequences for the world in general and member States in particular.

His Excellency Mr. Yasir Arafat, President of the State of Palestine, then delivered a speech to the same effect, as well as pointing out the grave situation prevailing in the Palestinian territories.

Then a message from His Majesty King Mohammed VI of the Kingdom of Morocco, Chairman of the Al-Quds Committee, was read out, followed by a speech by His Excellency the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

The Conference commended the address by the representative of the Islamic and Arab Organizations in the United States on behalf of the Muslim communities residing in the United States of America. It also welcomed the Christian-Islamic delegation accompanying President Yasir Arafat.

The Conference then proceeded to elect its Bureau as follows:

- State of Qatar — Chairman;
- Malaysia, Republic of Senegal, State of Palestine — Vice-Chairmen;
- Republic of Mali — Rapporteur.

His Excellency Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassem Bin Jabr Al Thani, Foreign Minister of the State of Qatar and Chairman of the ninth extraordinary session of Foreign Ministers of States members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, then assumed the Chair.

After debate and discussion, the Conference reached the following conclusions:

1. The Conference strongly condemned the brutal terrorist acts that befell the United States, caused huge losses in human lives from various nationalities and wreaked tremendous destruction and damage in New York and Washington. It further reaffirmed that these terrorist acts ran counter to the teachings of the divine religions as well as ethical and human values, stressed the necessity of tracking down the perpetrators of these acts in the light of the results of investigations and bringing them to justice to inflict on them the penalty they deserve, and underscored its support of this effort. In this respect, the Conference expressed its condolences to and sympathy with the people and Government of the United States and the families of the victims in these mournful and tragic circumstances.

2. The Conference, proceeding from the provisions of the OIC Convention on Combating International Terrorism, reaffirmed the willingness of its member States to effectively contribute to an international collective effort, under the umbrella of the United Nations as the forum where all States of the world are represented, to define the phenomenon of terrorism in all its forms and without selectiveness or double standards and to contribute also to addressing its causes, eradicating its roots and achieving international security and stability.

3. The Conference stressed that such shameful terrorist acts are opposed to the tolerant divine message of Islam which spurns aggression, calls for peace, coexistence, tolerance and respect among people, highly prizes the dignity of human life and prohibits the killing of the innocent. If further rejected any attempts to allege the existence of any connection or

relation between the Islamic faith and the terrorist acts, as such attempts are not in the interest of multilateral efforts to combat terrorism and further damage relations among peoples of the world. It stressed as well the need to undertake a joint effort to promote dialogue and create linkage between the Islamic world and the West in order to reach mutual understanding and build bridges of confidence between the two civilizations.

4. The Conference welcomed the positions adopted by both the United States and the other countries that called on their citizens to avoid causing any harm to citizens of Arab and Islamic descent and to Arabs and Muslims residing therein. It also called upon the international community to undertake the necessary measures to protect the rights of innocent civilians and avoid causing any harm to them during the process of undertaking any preventive measures in the fight against the phenomenon of terrorism and denounced aberrant voices that have tried to cause harm to Islam and Muslims.

5. The Conference reaffirmed the need to convene an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations to reflect the rejection by the international community of the use of terrorism in international relations, to agree on its definition and to draw up an international plan to combat terrorism within the framework of respect of member States' sovereignty and of international law. The United Nations, on the basis of such universally recognized definitions and guidelines, is the legitimate body to determine engagement or support for terrorism by any State or group.

6. The Conference stressed its rejection of any linkage between terrorism and the rights of the Islamic and Arab peoples, including the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples, the right to self-determination, self-defence, sovereignty and resistance against Israeli and foreign occupation, all of which are legitimate rights enshrined in the United Nations Charter and international law.

7. The Conference expressed hope that preoccupation with the effects of the events which befell the United States would not lead the international community to neglect shouldering its responsibilities vis-à-vis the State terrorism practised by the Israeli Government and to which the Palestinian people is being subjected and Israel's serious escalation of the situation in the region.

8. The Conference warned Israel of the consequences of its exploitation of these events as a pretext for perpetuating its aggression against the Palestinian people and the creation of new situations in the region which are likely to jeopardize security and stability therein.

9. The Conference requested the Security Council and the co-sponsors of the peace process, the United States and the Russian Federation, as well as the European Union and its member States, to exert their utmost effective efforts in order to lift the blockade and stop Israel's brutal practices, provide international protection for the Palestinian people and end the Israeli occupation of all Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967.

10. The Conference stressed that the international initiative towards achieving security and stability in a world free from terrorism and injustice must also include the achievement of security and justice for the Palestinian people, the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital, and the protection of the Christian and Islamic holy places. In this context, the Conference also welcomed the statements of President George W. Bush about the right of the Palestinians to establish their own State, which were supported by the Russian Federation, the European Union, China, Japan, the African States, the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, the international community and the United Nations, as a positive development in conformity with the resolutions of international legitimacy. It further expressed hope that the United States would immediately initiate the practical implementation of that issue and endeavour to achieve this strategic objective of establishing a just and comprehensive peace for all States and peoples of the region.

11. The Conference expressed its concern over the possible consequences of the fight against terrorism, including the death of innocent civilians in Afghanistan, and underlined the necessity of ensuring the territorial integrity of Afghanistan and its Islamic identity. It rejected the targeting of any Islamic or Arab State under the pretext of fighting terrorism.

12. The Conference welcomed the proposal by His Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar and Chairman of the Ninth

Islamic Summit Conference, to establish a fund to assist the Afghan people and His Highness's announcement to donate the amount of ten million US dollars (US$ 10,000,000) to this fund. It also welcomed the announcements of donations by the United Arab Emirates in the amount of three million US dollars (US$ 3,000,000), and the Sultanate of Oman in the amount of one million US dollars (US$ 1,000,000) to the fund for assistance to the Afghan people. The Conference took note of the announcement made by His Royal Highness the Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that the Kingdom has made a donation of ten million US dollars to the Afghan people and that the assistance has already reached its destination in Afghanistan. It further took note of the fact that the Kingdom will contribute to the rehabilitation projects specifically developed for the people of Afghanistan and urged the rest of the member States to continue to make donations to this noble humanitarian cause.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia

I. Introduction

1. In its presidential statement of 27 May 1999, the Security Council requested that I submit periodic reports on the situation in Somalia. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. The report covers the period since my last report (S/2000/1211), issued on 19 December 2000. It includes an account of political developments and an assessment of the security situation in and relating to Somalia. It also presents an overall picture of the humanitarian situation and the humanitarian assistance activities of United Nations agencies and their partners, as well as my observations regarding the possibility of establishing a United Nations post-conflict peace-building presence in Somalia.

II. Political developments

A. Internal political situation

3. In the period under review, the Transitional National Government (TNG), led by President Abdikassim Salad Hassan, has brought on board two of the five faction leaders based in Mogadishu, originally opposed to it. In December 2000, Hussein Haji Bod reached an agreement with the TNG, and in February 2001, Mohamed Qanyare Afrah joined the TNG as Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources. Another faction leader, Osman Hassan Ali "Atto", has held several positive discussions with the President and provided the TNG with technical assistance in the recent "Clean-up of Mogadishu" campaign. The other two faction leaders in Mogadishu — Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid and Musse Sudi "Yallahow" — continue to challenge the authority of the TNG.

4. In the early part of 2001, the TNG negotiated with the militias holding the Mogadishu seaport, but it remains closed because some faction leaders who control areas near the seaport, particularly Musse Sudi "Yallahow", have not agreed to its reopening. The TNG also sent delegations to various parts of Somalia for talks with clan leaders. While they met with some success in Hiran region, TNG delegations were ambushed by opposition militia in Gedo and Bakool. TNG claimed that the attacks were carried out with the backing of Ethiopia. The allegations were dismissed as baseless by Ethiopia.

5. On 18 June, the Chairman of the Lower Juba Alliance announced that an 11-member inter-clan council had been established in Kismayo and allied itself with the TNG. Following the failed attempts of General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan" to retake the city in August, negotiations are ongoing to broaden and reaffirm the control of the council.

6. Other faction leaders who attended the Somalia National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti, including General Omar Haji Mohamed "Masale" of the Somali National Front (SNF), Hassan Mohamed Nur "Shatigudud" of the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) and Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail of the Southern Somali National Movement-Biennal Resistance Movement (SSNM-BIREM), subsequently joined the ranks of those opposed to the TNG (see para. 13 below). Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed of "Puntland" denied reports that the TNG had been in direct contact with him.

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7. On 6 May, the TNG announced the appointment of the 25-member National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement (NCRPS), as provided for in article 30 of the Transitional National Charter (TNC) adopted at the Arta Conference. NCRPS was to be chaired by Abdirizak Haji Hussein, a respected former Prime Minister of Somalia. NCRPS was immediately denounced by TNG opponents in the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) and the "Puntland" administration. On 25 July, Abdirizak Haji Hussein stated that he had sent a letter of resignation to the Prime Minister of the TNG. He felt that he had not received the support of the Prime Minister and objected to the procedure adopted by the TNG in appointing members of NCRPS and in announcing its establishment.

8. No government infrastructure, such as a civil service, has existed in Somalia for more than a decade. The TNG inherited no personnel, buildings, archives, forces of law and order or tax-collecting capacity. Ministries are beginning to function and a number of buildings have been rehabilitated for their use. A judiciary is gradually coming into place, with Sharia courts and their militia being absorbed by the TNG. Personnel are gradually being put in place to take charge of a police system in the capital and police have returned to all 14 district police stations in Mogadishu under a command structure. The TNG claims that the lack of resources makes it impossible, for the time being, to introduce similar law and order arrangements in other parts of Somalia.

9. The second session of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) that began on 20 February approved several TNG appointments, including those of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Somalia, the Attorney General and ministers. The TNA has ratified the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Arab League Charter and debated different activities of the TNG. The third session, which began on 17 September, will consider pending questions, such as local administration and taxation.

10. A group including faction leaders who stayed away from the Arta conference and others who participated but later denounced it, excluding the three Hawiye opposition faction leaders from Mogadishu, gathered in El-Berde (on the Somalia-Ethiopia border) in mid-January and announced they had reached a number of agreements that would result in the reconstitution of Somalia. They stated that they would reconvene in Baidoa 45 days later, but such a meeting has not taken place.

11. From early March, the Mogadishu faction leaders and the leaders who had met in El-Berde gathered in Addis Ababa and subsequently convened in Awasa, Ethiopia. On 13 March, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was informed by Ethiopian officials that the objective of the meeting was to agree on a common platform to facilitate discussions with the TNG. Ethiopia denied that there was a plan for the establishment of a parallel government.

12. TNG leaders, including both the President and the Prime Minister, as well as the Speaker of the TNA, told my Representative during his visit to Mogadishu in March that they saw the meeting in Awasa as part of an Ethiopian plan to undermine the TNG. In a letter dated 21 March 2001 to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/263), the Prime Minister requested the Council to consider measures that would prevent "Ethiopian intervention" in Somalia's internal affairs. Ethiopia rejected the accusations in a letter dated 4 April 2001 (S/2001/325) addressed to the President of the Security Council.

13. At a press conference in Addis Ababa on 23 March, the Somali leaders who had met in Awasa announced the formation of the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). They stated that its aim would be to hold an "all-inclusive national reconciliation conference within six months to form a representative Transitional Government of National Unity". SRRC informed my Representative during his visit to Baidoa on 8 September that the conference was postponed and would now be convened late in 2002.

14. While some of the Rahanwein people and former RRA leaders continued to participate in the TNG and TNA, others, including the RRA Chairman, have continued to reject TNG overtures. In late March, a number of Digil and Mirifle elders were imprisoned by the RRA leadership. Additional arrests were made in September of clan elders returning from discussions in Mogadishu. According to RRA, the effort by these elders to reconcile RRA with the TNG was unacceptable to RRA leadership since they had no mandate from RRA. Internal divisions within the RRA Executive Committee over calls for a new leadership congress were also reported.

15. On 23 July, the Chairman of SRRC wrote to me about the situation in Somalia. He stated that SRRC was "deeply committed to a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Somalia through dialogue and genuine reconciliation, which can enable all parties to reach a satisfactory political solution acceptable to all as outlined in the SRRC's Charter and Political Programme". He reaffirmed this commitment to my Representative in Baidoa in September.

16. On 13 March, my Representative held discussions with Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and members of his administration in Hargeisa, "Somaliland". This was after the local press had reported, on 21 January, that the authorities in "Somaliland" would no longer welcome my Representative, accusing him of supporting the Arta process and "distortion of Somali reality". However, Mr. Egal told him that the "Somaliland" administration had taken no such decision. He clarified that such press accounts might have been based on a non-binding resolution of the "Somaliland" legislature. Mr. Egal maintained that "Somaliland" had separated from the rest of Somalia and was not concerned about developments in the rest of the country. Nevertheless, Mr. Egal said that he was prepared to offer his services to help the "south", if necessary, as a Somali elder.

17. On 12 April, the "Somaliland" administration destroyed a large consignment of cigarettes allegedly belonging to a prominent Djibouti businessman. In an apparent reaction, the Djibouti Government announced on 17 April that it had closed its border with "Somaliland". Since then, there have been no air, land or sea communications between Djibouti and "Somaliland". In July, in an attempt to improve relations between the two sides, Mr. Egal announced the appointment of a committee of elders with the aim of sending them to Djibouti. However, the border remains closed.

18. On 31 May, the "Somaliland" administration carried out a referendum on a new constitution. The first article of the constitution asserted the independence of "Somaliland", while other articles made new provisions for political parties and elections. The "Puntland" administration, as well as the TNG, opposed the referendum on the grounds that it violated the Act of Union of 1960.

19. Although the referendum was peaceful, it was largely avoided by the international community. There was no electoral register but the estimated number of voters was put at 1.3 million and officials claimed that 97 per cent of the voters endorsed the constitution. In a post-referendum press interview, Mr. Egal called on the international community to recognize "Somaliland". The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Salim A. Salim, said in a press interview a week before the referendum that OAU could not support any action that would affect the unity and sovereignty of Somalia.

20. In early July, Mr. Egal announced the formation of a new political party in "Somaliland", the Allied People's Democratic Party (UDUB), in preparation for parliamentary and presidential elections expected in 2002. A senior official of Mr. Egal's administration was elected Secretary-General. On 18 July, following a five-day meeting in Buroa, some elders concluded that UDUB was unconstitutional and called for its disbandment, but another larger group of elders refuted the allegation. On the same day, several members of parliament tabled a motion in parliament to impeach Mr. Egal on allegations of financial mismanagement and high treason, claiming that he had failed to pursue secession effectively. The motion was rejected in August.

21. On 13 March, Mr. Egal asked my Representative and the United Nations resident coordinator for Somalia to institute an inquiry into what he alleged was genocide carried out in parts of "Somaliland" by the former Barre regime during the Somali civil war in the late 1980s. He referred in particular to the need for a formal investigation into the mass graves that were discovered in Hargeisa and which appeared to date from that period. He said that he wanted to avoid the development of a "culture of impunity" with respect to the atrocities carried out against the people of "Somaliland" during the Somali civil war.

22. In her report of 26 January 2000 on the situation of human rights in Somalia (E/CN.4/2000/110), the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights noted the importance of efforts to preserve the evidence of mass graves in Hargeisa "in the context of possible action by the international community to bring the perpetrators of the killings to justice". The Special Rapporteur noted what she called the "serious human rights crisis" in central and southern Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu and Kismayo. She concluded that "much of what is happening in these areas amounts to war crimes and crimes against humanity". The RRA

leader has also called for an investigation into the atrocities committed against his people by the forces of the late General Aideed after the fall of the Barre regime.

23. Under the Transitional Charter of "Puntland", approved on 30 June 1998, the mandate of the "Puntland" administration expired on 30 June 2001. Rather than undertake presidential and parliamentary elections as stipulated in that Charter, the administration of "Puntland", citing the unfavourable situation in Somalia, sought a three-year extension of its term. A group of traditional elders referred the decision on the extension to the House of Representatives, which following a majority vote extended the terms of office of itself and the executive for three years on 27 June. The Chairman of the Supreme Court declared the extension unconstitutional. He announced that, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, he had assumed office as the legal interim "President of Puntland", pending the organization of a "community conference" within one month, as stipulated in the Transitional Charter.

24. Colonel Yusuf suspended the Chairman of the Supreme Court from office on 29 June and the House of Representatives ratified the decision on the following day. However, the Chairman maintained that the announcements of his removal were ultra vires and hence null and void. His position was upheld by a meeting of titled elders which concluded on 25 July. Colonel Yusuf argued that a decision of elders could not overturn a decision of the House of Representatives.

25. Following unsuccessful attempts by elders and businessmen to promote a peaceful solution to the constitutional crisis, fighting broke out in Bosasso on 6 August and Colonel Yusuf retreated to his hometown, Galkaiyo. The Chairman of the Supreme Court stated that he had no political ambitions himself and that he would organize a community meeting, as provided for in the Charter, to set the future course of "Puntland". The conference was officially opened in Garowe, on 26 August, with over 400 participants representing all five regions and is still in session. Meanwhile, Colonel Yusuf announced on 12 August that he remained President of "Puntland", claiming that Galkaiyo was the interim capital and blaming "fundamentalists" and the TNG for his difficulties. He has also publicly declared the conference in Garowe to be illegal and refused to participate.

26. The relative peace in the central regions of Bay, Bakool, Hiran, Galgadud and Mudug has continued. However, internal rifts within SNF in Gedo region occasionally resulted in fighting within the Marehan clan. In Belet-Hawa district, intra-Marehan fighting on 31 March led to the death of 30 persons and the movement of an estimated 10,000 persons into Kenya's border town of Mandera as refugees. A local peace accord was negotiated on 4 June, with the assistance of Ethiopia and Kenya according to some reports. The refugees began returning to Belet-Hawa on 7 June.

B. Regional and other peace initiatives

27. The League of Arab States at a summit meeting in Amman on 26 and 27 March 2001, adopted a resolution in which it called on "all factions and sections of the Somali people" to "work to their utmost with the elected President and his Government to bring about security and stability, to safeguard Somalia's territorial integrity and to bring about the country's rehabilitation and reconstruction." It called for funding of US$ 54 million to be made available for the absorption and resettlement of militias and the restoration of State institutions.

28. In early April, President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan, current Chairman of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), announced the appointment of Ambassador Ali A. Nimeri as his Special Envoy for Somalia. The appointment renewed expectations that the IGAD mechanism for the peace process in Somalia, agreed on at the IGAD summit in Khartoum in November 2000, would be put in place. Initially, the TNG rejected the appointment of the Special Envoy on the grounds that it had not been consulted about it in advance, but the problem was resolved. President Omar al-Bashir informed the thirty-seventh summit of OAU, held in Lusaka from 2 to 7 July 2001, of his intention to have his Special Envoy consult with all parties to the conflict in Somalia on the way forward. Sudan's Foreign Minister wrote to my Representative informing him that Sudan planned to convene a national reconciliation conference in the near future following an agreement reached at the OAU summit between Sudan, Djibouti and Ethiopia. The Special Envoy began consultations in Mogadishu at the end of July and also travelled to some countries in the region.

29. President Hassan paid an official visit to Kenya on 16 and 17 May. He asked President Moi to assist in bringing the leaders who did not attend the Arta meeting into the peace process as well as in mediating between Ethiopia and Somalia. President Moi invited the SRRC leaders to Nairobi and offered the assistance of Kenya in bringing them into dialogue with the TNG at a meeting he held with them on 25 May. President Moi informed me that he intended to hold a meeting with Somali leaders in early July, before the OAU Summit in Lusaka. However, it is my understanding that Ethiopia requested and Kenya consented to a delay in the convening of this meeting in Kenya.

30. Relations between Ethiopia and Somalia improved as a result of the visit of a TNG delegation led by the Deputy Prime Minister to Addis Ababa from 13 to 16 June. The two sides agreed to Ethiopia's offer to foster the peace process within the framework of the subcommittee of IGAD. The TNG Foreign Minister was reported as saying that some of the accusations that had been made by the TNG against Ethiopia were "exaggerated".

31. Ethiopian officials have since held meetings with some SRRC leaders in Addis Ababa as well. The Ethiopian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs went to Garowe on 19 June to confer with Colonel Yusuf. A follow-up visit by Ethiopian officials to Mogadishu was scheduled for the end of June but has yet to take place.

32. Despite a number of encouraging developments, however, the improvement in relations between the TNG and Ethiopia did not last. In early August, senior officials of the TNG accused Ethiopia of actively supporting the war efforts of General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan" and RRA in southern Somalia. Ethiopia denied these accusations. On 7 August, the TNG Minister of Information alleged that Ethiopian troops were entering Somali territory. On 14 August, the Foreign Minister of the TNG further alleged that an Ethiopian military officer was directing Ethiopian operations inside Somalia from Baidoa.

33. The TNG participated in the thirty-seventh summit of OAU in Lusaka. The OAU Council of Ministers, in its decision CM/Dec. 594 [LXXIV], reiterated, inter alia, the OAU commitment to the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia; called on the TNG to intensify efforts to build upon the outcome of the Arta process; supported the efforts aimed at the establishment of the NCRPS; and reaffirmed that a lasting solution to the conflict in Somalia could be found only through dialogue and the involvement of all the parties in a spirit of mutual accommodation and tolerance. The Council of Ministers also commended those political forces in Somalia that had agreed to engage in this process without preconditions, and strongly condemned the warlords who persisted in their stubbornness in blocking the peace efforts in Somalia. Finally, OAU requested its Secretary-General, in close cooperation with the regional organizations concerned, to continue to support the TNG in its efforts to sustain reconciliation and reconstruction in Somalia. Subsequently, the OAU Secretary-General announced his intention to field a mission to consult with all parties to the conflict in Somalia.

34. I used the opportunity of my presence at the OAU summit to meet President Hassan and encouraged him to make further efforts towards the completion of the Arta process. I also understand that President Hassan and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi held talks in Lusaka.

35. A number of European missions visited Somalia for consultations with all leaders. They included missions from Norway and Italy as well as a European Union (EU) "troika" made up of Sweden, Belgium and the European Commission. The Government of Switzerland has been sponsoring a series of technical-level meetings between a Swiss constitutional lawyer and Somali officials. They have been considering options, based on the Menu of Options published by the European Commission in 1995, for decentralized political structures for Somalia as envisaged in the TNC.

36. Following the outbreak of fighting in Mogadishu, Lower Shabelle, "Puntland" and other parts of Somalia, the Presidency of the EU issued a statement on 10 August (see S/2001/792), calling on all parties to "exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid further bloodshed". It called on the TNG to pursue efforts towards national reconciliation, and welcomed the creation of the NCRPS. It also insisted "that all States should refrain from any military intervention in the internal affairs of Somalia" so as not to jeopardize "the sovereignty, political independence and unity of Somalia". The EU urged IGAD and its Member States to enhance their efforts aimed at encouraging the reconciliation process in Somalia.

37. The Sudanese Ministry of External Relations issued a statement on 14 August expressing similar regret at events in Lower Juba region, Kismayo and "Puntland". It called on all Somali groups to commit themselves to dialogue and abstain from fighting. It also stressed the Sudan's commitment to exerting further efforts to coordinate with other countries of the region to achieve reconciliation in accordance with the decision of the eighth IGAD summit, held in Khartoum on 23 and 24 November 2000.

38. My Representative continues to meet, as security circumstances allow, with all parties in Somalia. In March, he visited Hargeisa and Mogadishu and met a high-level SRRC delegation in Nairobi on 13 July. In September, he visited Mogadishu and Baidoa, meeting with members of the TNG, faction leaders and leaders of SRRC. He also undertook wide-ranging consultations with regional actors on Somalia in May and June. The consultations involved Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Yemen, the League of Arab States and IGAD. My Representative reported that there was broad agreement that the Somali situation required urgent attention and that the TNG could be the basis for completing the Djibouti peace process. There was also a widely shared view on the need for a mechanism that would facilitate a uniform approach and exchange of information among States and organizations with interest in the Somali peace process.

III. The humanitarian and development situation

39. Economic and social systems sustaining both lives and livelihoods in Somalia have been disrupted by more than a decade of conflict, as well as recurrent drought and flooding. In 2000, conditions across Somalia improved significantly due to positive environmental conditions and good harvests. However, the gains have been insufficient to break the seasonal cycle for poor and middle-income households.

40. In recent months, this vulnerability has been exacerbated by a number of factors: the partial failure of the *gu* rains in key food-producing regions of the south; the economic downturn due to the ban on livestock exports from the north; insecurity and violent conflict; and inflation due to injections of new Somali shilling notes. These factors are not expected to produce large-scale, life-threatening conditions over the next six months. However, with persistent malnutrition rates of between 15 to 20 per cent in vulnerable areas and child mortality rates as high as 224 per 1,000, aid agencies will have to continue to provide significant levels of humanitarian aid to prevent rapid livelihood deterioration and loss of life.

41. An estimated 750,000 people are in need of international assistance to cover food shortfall due to past harvest failure. Following the partial failure of the *gu* rains in southern Somalia, Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Hiran regions will face severely reduced harvest output of sorghum — the main staple crop. The full extent of food insecurity will only become evident in the October-December period. The heaviest burden will be borne by poor agro-pastoralists, who number nearly 400,000 individuals in the above-mentioned regions. Water catchments in these regions are already drying up, although pasture conditions are near the seasonal norm and household food stocks are considered adequate (but decreasing) following good harvests in 2000. Lack of water is likely to lead to above-normal stress migration and may increase the prevalence of disease.

42. Initial estimates indicate that food security in southern Somalia may deteriorate rapidly if commodity price levels increase; terms of trade for labour, milk and agricultural produce deteriorate; or transport routes, market access and kinship networks that are open for trade with surplus-producing areas (e.g., the Juba and Shabelle regions) become restricted. On its own, one season of limited harvest output will not lead to a serious crisis. In this regard, the success of the *deyr* season rains/harvest in late 2001 is the major risk factor to be monitored. In addition to immediate response measures, continued focus on the structural causes of vulnerability is required, including measures to address chronic health factors, ensuring access to basic social services and rebuilding poor household asset bases.

43. In northern regions, the livestock ban continues to reduce the ability of poor households to procure necessary food commodities. The most vulnerable groups include internally displaced persons and the urban poor (both of whom rely on trade-related employment), as well as poor pastoralist households (which receive fewer remittances and rely on urban employment as a coping mechanism). The effects of the livestock ban have been mitigated by favourable

environmental conditions in 2000 and the increased remittances from the Somali diaspora. Towards the end of the dry season in April, many pastoralist groups were forced into debt to procure water, while livestock in the coastal areas of Awdal died due to lack of pasture and water. The arrival of the *gu* rainy season alleviated these stresses. However, if the *deyr* season rains are not favourable in the north-east and north-west, domestic production may no longer be an adequate buffer against the shock of economic downturn and widespread food insecurity may emerge. Continuous monitoring is required.

44. To date, the annual cholera outbreak has generated less than one quarter of the number of cases recorded in 2000. If this trend continues, it will be the mildest outbreak since 1994. Since 1 January, a total of 1,742 cases and 120 deaths have been recorded, leaving an overall case fatality rate of 6.9 per cent. No significant changes in other key diseases, including kala azar, measles and malaria, were reported.

45. While environmental factors are undoubtedly important in determining the vulnerability of the Somali population, they disguise the underlining reasons for vulnerability of at least one quarter of the Somali population to threats of violence, displacement, disease and lack of food and water. It is therefore important to identify the key economic factors affecting livelihoods across the country. These are man-made factors that exist within the natural context of aridity and environmental uncertainty. They include asset depletion and destitution; lack of labour opportunities; limited benefits to the poor from economic expansion; lack of infrastructure and social services; lack of macroeconomic management; and market dependency and volatility.

46. In response to these conditions, United Nations agencies elaborated a multisectoral strategy to protect and rebuild livelihoods, prevent and respond to emergency situations and support the transition towards peace and reconciliation. To this end, United Nations agencies work in tandem with over 60 international NGOs and the Red Cross movement, which comprise, together with donors, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB). The United Nations agencies have adopted a four-part humanitarian and development strategy to increase access to essential social services and build an enabling environment for peace and reconciliation. The pillars of this strategy are to gain access to vulnerable populations; secure a safe operating environment; provide assistance and protection; and improve coordination, security and support services. Implicit in the United Nations approach is respect for Somali partnership and impartiality in the provision of assistance.

47. Despite the best efforts of United Nations agencies, NGOs and donors, public access to aid services is limited by the concentration of projects in urban areas, dwindling agency presence in southern regions and a continually dwindling funding base. The limited access to safe water (some 28 per cent of the population) and primary school education (enrolment of 13.8 per cent of children) are indications of the critically low access to basic social services by the majority of the population. Without further assistance, it will be impossible to extend the United Nations presence in Somalia and provide emergency assistance to populations in need.

48. Accomplishing this strategy is possible only if adequate financial and material resources are available. To support its humanitarian, recovery and development activities, United Nations agencies issued the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2001. According to the SACB donor report for 2000, total international donor assistance to Somalia in the year 2000 was US$ 115.5 million. Emergency assistance accounted for 45 per cent, and development assistance 55 per cent, of overall contributions. The report estimated that humanitarian and development efforts in the "Somaliland" and "Puntland" areas amounted to 42 per cent of contributions and the "South" 31 per cent, while the remaining 27 per cent was spent on programmes implemented on a country-wide basis. In the current year, $20.7 million (16 per cent) of the $129 million requested for the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2001 has been provided by Member States. Programmes linked to the TNG have received virtually no assistance from international donors, including United Nations agencies, although the TNG itself has received some support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.

IV. Security

49. The security situation in Somalia remains tenuous. On 27 March, militiamen loyal to one of the faction leaders in Mogadishu, Musse Sudi "Yallahow", attacked the compound in north Mogadishu of the international non-governmental organization Médecins

sans frontières Spain (MSF-Spain). Indiscriminate shooting into the MSF-Spain compound continued for a period of about two hours until the defenders of the compound were overpowered. Six international United Nations staff members and three MSF-Spain colleagues, with whom they had been meeting, were abducted. The compound, including valuable health-care equipment belonging to MSF-Spain, was looted. All international staff were eventually released unharmed, but several fatalities were recorded among Somali guards and Sudi's militia.

50. A peace meeting between some Hawiye leaders and Hussein Aidid at the Mogadishu seaport on 11 May deteriorated into fighting between his militia and those of a businessman ally of the TNG, who owned a warehouse opposite the seaport. The fighting resulted in the death of a reported 26 persons and the wounding of about 50. The speedy intervention of elders helped to minimize the casualties. On 28 June, Mr. Aidid's militia clashed with the TNG police, who had been involved in an operation to purge the city of bandits. Two further clashes occurred in July. In north Mogadishu, a dispute among Abgal sub-clans caused several deaths before elders resolved the issue, while in the south a number of people died when militiamen attempted to loot a food aid convoy provided by Saudi Arabia. Because of the continued security problem, the seaport and airport in Mogadishu remain closed. There have been sporadic clashes between faction militias and the TNG police, but since July these have been relatively minor.

51. On 25 July, General "Morgan" and his militiamen moved south from Bay and Bakool with the intention of capturing Kismayo. The planned offensive resulted in many deaths as the militia encountered those of the Lower Juba Alliance in Buale and Jilib, among other places. Fighting continued throughout August. The Lower Juba Alliance regained control of Buale from "Morgan's" forces, who are reported to have positions around Afnadow and Dinsoor.

52. The constitutional crisis in "Puntland", as mentioned earlier, has broken a decade of relative peace in the area. On 5 and 6 August, fighting between Colonel Yusuf's forces and those of the Chairman of the Supreme Court resulted in the relocation of United Nations humanitarian staff from Bossaso to Hargeisa. Although staff were soon allowed to return, tensions remain high. On 23 August, the relative stability of "Somalilard" was affected by the arrests of four Sultans at a gathering of traditional leaders. There were clashes between Government forces and Sultan militias, resulting in five deaths and a brief suspension of United Nations activities.

53. Piracy and forcible detention of sailors on trawlers fishing illegally in Somali territorial waters has continued. Two fishing vessels, said to be Russian-owned, were detained by a militia leader in the Kismayo port on 10 March. On 2 August, a fishing boat sailing under the Italian flag with a Kenyan crew was seized with a full catch and taken to the northern port of Eyl.

54. On 28 July, President Daniel Arap Moi ordered a ban on all border trade between Kenya and Somalia and placed an embargo on commercial flights between the two countries. The President's press service stated that the move was aimed at curbing the flow of small arms into Kenya from Somalia. President Moi had imposed a similar ban in August 1999.

55. During August and September there were two security assessment missions to Mogadishu. These assessments concluded that the situation had improved, relative to the time of the hostage-taking incident in March, somewhat and the presence of weapons in the streets had been reduced. There was also an increased police presence and a reduction in banditry. This marginal improvement allowed United Nations international staff to visit the city for a very limited period of time.

56. On 24 September, a Somali-based organization, Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya, was included in the United States list of 27 organizations suspected to have terrorist links. The same day, the United Nations temporarily evacuated its international staff from Somalia due to the withdrawal of war-risk insurance coverage by the insurance company covering United Nations flights in and out of the country. United Nations international staff resumed their functions inside Somalia on 29 September.

V. Observations

57. The conclusion of the Djibouti peace process in Arta was an important milestone in the search for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. I share the views of OAU, IGAD and EU that the completion of the Arta process remains the most viable option for lasting peace in Somalia.

58. The international community will wish to bear in mind that there has been no central administration of any description in Somalia for the past 10 years. The TNG inherited none of the formal institutions of a modern State on the basis of which a national authority could be said to have control over a territory. Any Government in Somalia, no matter who forms it, would face similar problems. In this regard, I welcome the fact that Ahmed Abdi Hashi presented his credentials as the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations on 12 September.

59. Both the TNG and SRRC claim to be national, multi-clan alliances. Both have stated that they wish to pursue national reconciliation. Both include personalities who were prominent in the previous Siad Barre regime. Neither seems to disagree on any major political issue, including such potentially divisive issues as the role of religion in the State or relationships between central and local administrations. Clearly, the differences ought not to be irreconcilable.

60. In recent weeks, the authority of the "Presidents" of both "Somaliland" and "Puntland", in particular the latter, has been challenged. This has led to uncertainty regarding the political stability of those regions.

61. While the search for a national solution continues, much more attention could be paid to local political settlements. Nevertheless, recent events have shown that disputes which often appear to be purely local cannot be solved by local actors alone at the local level. Thus, the process of rebuilding national institutions should go forward alongside strong and impartial efforts at local reconciliation. Ongoing United Nations programmes to enhance local capacities should be strengthened as a parallel means to advance reconciliation at the local and national levels.

62. I welcome the commitment of the TNG and of other Somali leaders to engage in a dialogue without preconditions. I reiterate my call on Somali leaders to put aside their narrow interests and work together for the interest of the people of Somalia at large.

63. As I have stated in my previous reports, the Somali parties should dedicate themselves entirely to the effort to achieve the ultimate objective: the return of their country to peace, stability and overall normalcy. Unless they make a genuine political effort, the present plight of Somalia will continue. On the other hand, the external actors, including OAU, IGAD, the United Nations and its Member States, will need to help in sustaining that effort.

64. Such a dialogue could be facilitated by a suitable framework for negotiation. It would be important for IGAD to put in place the mechanism agreed upon at the Khartoum summit in November 2000. The National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement foreseen in the TNC could be one option for promoting national reconciliation in Somalia.

65. Until recently, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs had organized periodic ambassadorial meetings on Somalia in New York. Also, a Standing Committee on Somalia used to meet in Addis Ababa. Those meetings were discontinued following the Arta conference. In the present circumstances, a mechanism for the exchange of information and the coordination of efforts among external actors is still needed. The mechanism could bring together interested countries and organizations in an effort to support the search for lasting peace in Somalia.

66. I intend to consult all concerned on the feasibility and usefulness of setting up a Committee of Friends of Somalia to focus on ways and means of drawing attention to Somalia's needs in the area of national reconciliation as well as to help mobilize funds for rehabilitation and development. The membership of such a Committee should include relevant IGAD countries and members of the IGAD Partners Forum and could be jointly chaired by my Representative and a representative of an IGAD member State.

67. I continue to be concerned about the human rights situation in Somalia. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights visited Somalia from 28 August to 7 September 2001 and his report to the Commission is under preparation.

68. I am also concerned that, despite the best efforts of United Nations and other humanitarian and development agencies, large sections of the Somali population continue to suffer from the internal conflict and its consequences with little hope of improvement in their living conditions. Moreover, the unfavourable security conditions in the country continue to prevent the United Nations and its humanitarian and development partners from providing assistance to those in need on a continuous and unimpeded basis. The United Nations will continue to make every effort to provide humanitarian and development assistance in Somalia. In this regard, I would like to reiterate my

appeal to potential donors to respond generously to the consolidated appeals process and contribute to ongoing and future development programmes in Somalia.

69. The political, humanitarian and development challenges faced by Somalia are of such magnitude that the peace-building process is likely to take a long time to complete. A key role for the international community at present is to support a Somali peace process, the establishment of the rule of law and the emergence of impartial national political and judicial institutions in Somalia. Somalia will need help to rebuild its administrative and physical infrastructure. It is useful to note that efforts in these fields are under way, albeit limited to certain areas. The United Nations stands ready to expand its support in such areas as political and security conditions permit.

70. Pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council on 11 January 2001, I asked the Secretariat to undertake the necessary consultations with a view to preparing a proposal for a peace-building office for Somalia. The consultations indicated some confusion among Somali leaders as to what such an office might involve. The TNG and Somali civil society supported the idea in general. However, some of those opposed to the TNG had the impression that such an office would work solely with, and in support of, the TNG.

71. There is clearly a need for the United Nations to carry out a thorough review of the security situation in Somalia. Such an assessment could only be undertaken with the consent and cooperation of the TNG and other political and faction leaders.

72. As the Security Council is aware, a security assessment of Mogadishu undertaken in late February 2001 concluded that the security situation did not make it possible to deploy a peace-building office in the country. Since then, the Secretariat has also reported to the Council in informal consultations that the security situation in Somalia has not improved and remains, by and large, the same today. Moreover, the seaport and airport remain closed and there is no single authority in the country that can assure security and unimpeded access to the United Nations even in Mogadishu.

73. In the circumstances, it is not possible at present for me to recommend the deployment of a post-conflict peace-building mission in Somalia. I will continue to monitor the situation in the country closely. When it improves enough to allow for the establishment of such a mission, I will submit a detailed proposal to the Security Council.

74. I would like to thank my Representative and the staff of UNPOS for their valuable role in monitoring and reporting on the situation in Somalia, and propose that the mandate of UNPOS be renewed for another two years (2002-2003). I commend United Nations humanitarian and development agencies for continuing to carry out their much needed — indeed essential — activities in the country.

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Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 11 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to attach the text of a statement by the Council of Ministers of the United Arab Emirates, dated 8 October 2001, in which the United Arab Emirates takes a firm position with regard to the military operations conducted against international terrorism centres, deplores the humanitarian situation of the Afghan people and expresses its gratitude to the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom for their statments rejecting the idea that terrorism and Islam are one and the same.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdul-Aziz Bin Nasser **Al-Shamsi**
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 11 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Council of Ministers on developments with respect to Afghanistan

The United Arab Emirates reaffirms its support for the international efforts aimed at combating terrorism. It is aware of the reasons underlying the military operations currently being waged against the international terrorism centres and receiving broad international support. The United Arab Emirates must, however, express its support and solidarity for the Afghan people in their current predicament and its commitment to the humanitarian efforts which are being made to ease their suffering. We appeal to those concerned to spare innocent civilians, and we request the international community to make serious and responsible efforts to counter terrorism, wherever it may arise, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and also to prevail upon Israel to end immediately its terrorist operations against the Palestinian people. Such is the firm position of the United Arab Emirates, as expressed by the Head of State, His Excellency Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who has stated that he strongly repudiates terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and has invited the international community to unite its forces in combating terrorism and eliminating it in accordance with the principles of international legitimacy.

The United Arab Emirates is pleased that the President of the United States, George Bush, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, have rejected the idea that terrorism and Islam are one and the same and have condemned the hostility being shown to Arabs and Muslims. The United Arab Emirates again denounces the campaign of hatred that some Western media are conducting against the Arabs and Muslims in order to denigrate Islam, which is in actuality a religion of peace, brotherhood and tolerance.

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Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 13 (b) of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia

I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 13 (b) of its resolution 1343 (2001) of 7 March 2001, the Security Council requested me to submit to it, six months from the date of the adoption of the resolution, a report on the steps taken by the Government of Liberia to improve its capacity in air traffic control and surveillance in accordance with the recommendations of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1306 (2000) and any advice that might be provided by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request. It is based on information provided to the United Nations Office in Liberia on the measures taken by the Government of Liberia regarding air traffic control and surveillance as well as the steps it has taken to obtain the advice and assistance of ICAO in that regard.

II. Steps taken by Liberia in January to improve its air traffic control and surveillance capacity

3. In paragraph 4 (b) of my previous report (S/2001/424), I indicated that the Government of Liberia had, according to information provided to the United Nations Office in Liberia, grounded all aircraft registered under the Liberian flag until their owners produced documentary evidence of their airworthiness under Liberia's civil aviation laws and on the basis of the standards established by ICAO. That measure, adopted on 22 January 2001, followed the publication of the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000) (S/2000/1195).

4. In paragraphs 12 and 13 of my report, I also detailed other measures implemented by the Government of Liberia following the grounding of aircraft registered under its flag, as well as the assistance and cooperation that the Government of Liberia had sought from ICAO.

III. Measures implemented by the Government of Liberia since January

5. Since the implementation of the above-mentioned measures in January, the Government of Liberia has, according to information provided to the United Nations Office in Liberia, taken the following additional steps:

(a) In order to alleviate the shortcomings and deficiencies in its airspace system, the Government of Liberia has reportedly purchased from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland a turnkey system to replace its outdated air traffic control tower system. The new equipment is due to be installed and commissioned by the contractor, System Interface Limited of Essex, by December 2001. The new system is said to include a three-position control desk, a crash alarm, an air traffic control clock system, a signal

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lamp, very-high frequency transmitters and receivers, a voice recorder, tower accessories and a back-up power distribution system to ensure continuous operation;

(b) According to the Government, the installation of a new air traffic control system, in addition to enhancing the country's capacity in air traffic control, would help to overcome the limitations of conventional systems and allow its air traffic management system to develop in line with the communication, navigation, surveillance/air traffic management concept. In the Government's view, its decision to acquire the system represents a step-by-step approach towards a communication, navigation, surveillance/air traffic management concept;

(c) According to the Government, that concept coincides with the ICAO recommendation requiring States to implement area control as soon as possible, with a view to increasing air traffic safety. The Government has also reported that the new operational concept would be essential to providing increased efficiency. The Government has further observed that effective air traffic management was essential to ensuring the safety, regularity and efficiency of international civil aviation and that the implementation of emerging technologies should fulfil the requirements for a regional air traffic management system. In its view, the new approach is designed to lead initially to improved harmonization of air traffic services, which, ultimately, would help to achieve a globally integrated air traffic management system;

(d) The Government of Liberia also reported that efforts were being made to establish links between the Roberts International Airport Air Traffic Control Centre in Monrovia and the domestic airports of the hinterland as they became operational and that, meanwhile, the Civil Aviation Authority and the Liberian Domestic Airport Agency were making plans to take an inventory of and to inspect domestic airports;

(e) In order to enhance its supervisory and monitoring capacity, the Government of Liberia has indicated its intention to install a microwave link between the Office of the Director of Civil Aviation in Monrovia and the Roberts International Airport Air Traffic Control Centre.

Liberia's initiative in air traffic management within the Roberts flight information region

6. In keeping with the global trend towards regional groupings and combined airspace, Liberia, according to the Government, continues to be a member of the Roberts flight information region and adheres, therefore, to the African-Indian Ocean air navigation plan and other navigational and air traffic operational requirements and protocols. The Government has stressed, however, that as a result of continuous cross-border incursions by dissident forces and due to increased national security concerns associated with those incidents, it has decided to temporarily assume independent management of Liberian airspace, pending an improvement in relations among the Mano River Union countries.

7. According to the Government, the above contingency plan requires the installation of appropriate equipment at the Roberts International Airport Air Traffic Control Centre and the reactivation of the aeronautical fixed telecommunication network equipment already established at the Centre. It also requires that the Roberts flight information region be reactivated and operated by a team of exclusively Liberian technicians working under the direct supervision of the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority.

8. The Government has asserted that with the provisional technical innovations set out above, the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority has assumed a more active role in airspace management which, hitherto, had more or less been delegated to Roberts International Airport and the Roberts flight information region. In this connection, the Government draws attention to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) as it applies to international standards and recommended practices, and underlines the principle that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.

IV. Contact between the Government of Liberia and the International Civil Aviation Organization

9. Following the decision of the Government of Liberia to temporarily manage, by itself, its territorial airspace, the Secretary-General of the Roberts flight

information region requested an informal coordination meeting on air traffic management within the region. The meeting, according to the Government, was held under the auspices of the ICAO Regional Office for West and Central Africa, based in Dakar, on 26 and 27 March 2001. According to the Government, several items were discussed, including:

(a) A preliminary exchange of views on ICAO procedures in the African-Indian Ocean air navigation plan;

(b) A review of Liberia's unilateral decision relative to the control and management of its airspace and its implications for safety and the flow of air traffic in accordance with the African-Indian Ocean air navigation plan and regulations;

(c) A review of the implications for the air traffic services route network within the Roberts flight information region in relation to units providing air traffic services in accordance with the African-Indian Ocean air navigation plan and regulations;

(d) A review of the implications for communication and coordination problems in relation to the African-Indian Ocean air navigation plan;

(e) A review of the implications for operational letters on air traffic management; search and rescue; communication, navigation and surveillance and aeronautical information service agreements between the Roberts Air Traffic Control Centre and the Conakry, Freetown and Roberts approach control centres within the Roberts flight information region and adjacent centres;

(f) The development and harmonization of territorial airspace contingency plans related to air traffic management; search and rescue; communication, navigation and surveillance and aeronautical information services within the Roberts flight information region.

10. At that meeting, the Government of Liberia maintained that some flight information regions in the African-Indian Ocean region were closely aligned with national boundaries and that this was understandable from the point of view that States had complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above their territory and had, as a result, a regulatory monopoly. The Government noted, however, that it strongly believed in and adhered to the ICAO policy that member States might achieve further efficiency and economy through consolidation of facilities and services.

11. The Liberian Government further reported that the following "points of principle", had been agreed upon at the Dakar meeting:

(a) That the integrity of the Roberts flight information region would be maintained in accordance with the ICAO/African-Indian Ocean air navigation plan;

(b) That the safety of international air navigation would remain paramount and in compliance with ICAO procedures and provisions;

(c) That Liberia would control its territorial airspace while remaining a member of the Roberts flight information region and working in harmony with its neighbours;

(d) That there was need to seek operational solutions within the flight information region for the points raised by Liberia;

(e) That cooperation and coordination among all concerned States should be established;

(f) That technical solutions should be explored to preserve both the integrity of the Roberts flight information region and the sovereignty of each State party.

12. A draft memorandum of understanding on the above-mentioned issues, agreed upon by all parties concerned within the Roberts flight information region, had been forwarded with the comments of the Government of Liberia, to be signed by the Roberts approach control centre and the Roberts flight information region, according to the Government's report.

13. The parties attending the meeting, according to the Government, had also agreed on the need to find a technical and operational solution acceptable to all parties without degrading the integrity of the Roberts flight information region. A small working group comprising the three parties, namely, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as the Roberts flight information region secretariat with assistance from the ICAO secretariat, had been established, and had proposed that the Roberts Air Traffic Control Centre:

(a) Provide clearance for and coordinate traffic to Roberts Approach Control entering Liberian airspace at Matru, Tekto, Ponka and Ritam;

(b) Reactivate the aeronautical fixed telecommunication network at Roberts International Airport;

(c) Assess and train, as needed, Liberian communications personnel to operate and maintain equipment;

(d) Assign only Liberians to the Roberts Approach Control Centre.

14. With regard to military flights, the Liberian Government has referred to article 4 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation by which States agreed not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of the Convention. In this connection, the Government of Liberia has stated that it would continue to remain committed to the improvement and safety of its air navigation and air traffic management initiatives.

15. The Government has also reported that during meetings it held in July 2001 with members of the United Nations Panel of Experts, the Government's attention had been drawn to the fact that certain aircraft had been flying under the Liberian "EL" registration mark despite the Government's claim that it had effectively de-registered and closed the Liberian air registry. In addition to closing the air registry, the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority had reportedly also begun to formulate and establish a new system of civil aviation registration based on the Gates system, which is designed to ensure strict conformity with the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The draft of the proposed registry had, according to the Government, been completed and would be reviewed by ICAO technicians in the near future.

16. In a letter dated 30 July 2001 addressed to the Secretary-General of ICAO, the Liberian Minister for Transport requested that, on the basis of the recommendation of the Panel of Experts, the previous Liberian "EL" aircraft registration mark should be changed to either "RL", "LI", "LB" or "ML" to ensure that unscrupulous persons do not continue to avail themselves of the "EL" mark.

V. Observations

17. From the report submitted by the Liberian Government to the United Nations Office in Liberia, it would appear that its Civil Aviation Authority has remained in contact with the ICAO since the publication in December 2000 of the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1306 (2000).

18. The Government had dispatched its Minister for Transport and the Director of Civil Aviation to ICAO headquarters to seek its cooperation and assistance in reforming its civil aviation administration soon after the publication of the report of the Panel of Experts.

19. As reported in paragraph 9 of the present report, an informal coordination meeting on air traffic management within the Roberts flight information region was held under the auspices of the ICAO regional office in Dakar on 26 and 27 March. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Liberia's decision to manage temporarily its territorial airspace.

20. According to the Government, the new system of civil aviation registration established by the Liberian civil aviation authorities on the basis of the Gates system would be reviewed by a team of ICAO technicians who are due to visit Liberia shortly. In addition, the Directorate of Civil Aviation of the Liberian Ministry of Transport on 30 July sought the approval of ICAO to change its "EL" aircraft registration so as to put an end to its illegal use by unscrupulous aircraft operators.

21. As indicated above, the present report has been prepared on the basis of information provided to the United Nations Office in Liberia by the Government of Liberia. The Office does not itself have the capacity to independently confirm the claims of the Government of Liberia on any of the pertinent issues.

22. It can be observed from the report provided by the Government of Liberia that efforts are being made by the Liberian authorities to reform their civil aviation administration and that the assistance of ICAO has been sought in that regard. I hope that ICAO will continue to extend the necessary cooperation and assistance to the Liberian authorities with a view to meeting the objectives sought under paragraph 13 (b) of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001).